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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the roles of the U.S. Army in America’s nuclear undertakings. Since 
1942, when the Army took responsibility for managing the Manhattan Project, the Army 
has made many important contributions to America’s nuclear endeavors. Its earliest 
nuclear roles included developing and employing America’s first nuclear weapons, 
executing nuclear counterproliferation missions, investigating the effects of nuclear 
weapons, and supervising the U.S. atomic energy program. Although the Army’s nuclear 
responsibilities were altered during the early years of the Cold War, it continued to 
participate in America’s nuclear efforts. The Army’s Cold War nuclear roles included 
deploying tactical nuclear weapons, participating in nuclear weapons tests, developing 
doctrine and reorganizing the Army’s units in preparation for a nuclear war, managing a 
nuclear power program, contributing to the debate on national strategy, and helping to 
reassure U.S. allies and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Today, the Army 
continues to make important contributions to the nation’s nuclear endeavors, notably in 
preparedness for attack forensics and consequence management. U.S. strategic planners 
must understand the several nuclear functions that the Army has performed throughout 
history in order to appreciate more fully the relevance of the Army’s current nuclear 
capacities.  
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
While America’s influence in the nuclear age is generally well understood, the 
contributions of the U.S. Army in America’s nuclear undertakings are not quite as 
obvious. This research project will examine the most significant U.S. nuclear efforts 
involving the contributions, roles, and views of the U.S. Army. It seeks to answer a 
simple, yet important, question: What roles has the U.S. Army played in the nation’s 
nuclear endeavors? 
B. IMPORTANCE  
U.S. strategic planners must understand the various nuclear functions that the 
Army has performed throughout history in order to evaluate more thoroughly the 
effectiveness of the Army’s current nuclear capacities. An awareness of the Army’s past 
successes and failures in the nuclear field will better prepare defense professionals to 
meet future challenges, such as advances in science and technology that may produce 
non-nuclear weapons comparable in destructive power to some nuclear warhead types or 
that may make nuclear weapons production easier for adversary or “outlier” states to 
accomplish. Such understanding is also critical for the Army’s role in future 
counterproliferation missions, including planning for military actions in nuclear-armed 
states. It is imperative that the U.S. Army keep in mind the lessons of the past to evaluate 
the responsibilities and readiness of its nuclear soldiers continuously, particularly as U.S. 
policymakers and intelligence officials emphasize the significance of nuclear weapons in 
U.S. national security. 
As the nation’s premier land force, the U.S. Army plays an important role in 
deterring war and defending the nation.1 Ever since the Soviet Union acquired an atomic 
arsenal in 1949, the United States has faced a nuclear-armed adversary. In 2009, 
                                                 
1 Raymond T. Odierno, Chief of Staff of the Army, “CSA Sends-Waypoint #2,” e-mail message to 
U.S. Army personnel, February 21, 2014. 
 2 
President Barack Obama stated that, despite the peaceful conclusion of the Cold War, the 
chances of a nuclear attack today are even greater than during that prolonged contest: 
In a strange turn of history, the threat of global nuclear war has gone 
down, but the risk of a nuclear attack has gone up. More nations have 
acquired these weapons. Testing has continued. Black market trade in 
nuclear secrets and nuclear materials abound. The technology to build a 
bomb has spread. Terrorists are determined to buy, build or steal one.2  
For decades, policymakers have emphasized the significance of proliferation, 
nuclear surety, and credible deterrence. Although the Reagan administration regarded the 
Soviet Union as the nation’s biggest threat, it still recognized the dangers of nuclear 
proliferation.3 Indeed, all presidents since Harry Truman have been preoccupied with the 
risks of nuclear proliferation. President George H. W. Bush also acknowledged the 
growing danger of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.4 In 1993, Secretary 
of Defense Les Aspin mentioned that increased global trade and advanced technology 
were contributing to weapons proliferation.5 Seven years later President William Clinton 
added “open borders” to that list,6 and in 2002, President George W. Bush proclaimed, 
“the gravest danger to freedom lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology.”7 
President Bush’s National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, voiced her concerns 
about Iraq’s WMD program, stating, “We don’t want the smoking gun to be a mushroom 
cloud.”8 The Obama administration made it clear in the 2010 National Security Strategy 
                                                 
2 “Remarks by President Barack Obama,” White House, April 5, 2009, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-
Delivered.  
3 White House, National Security Strategy of the United States, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
January 1988. http://history.defense.gov/resources/nss1988.pdf, 5. 
4 White House, National Security Strategy of the United States, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
March 1990, http://history.defense.gov/resources/nss1990.pdf, 17.  
5 Les Aspin quoted in James A. Russell, “WMD Proliferation, Globalization, and International 
Security: Whither the Nexus and National Security?” in Globalization and WMD Proliferation: Terrorism, 
Transnational Networks, and International Security, ed. James A. Russell and James J. Wirtz (New York: 
Routledge, 2008), 2.  
6 White House, A National Security Strategy for a Global Age, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
2000, http://history.defense.gov/resources/nss2000.pdf, 4. 
7 White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Office of the Secretary 
of Defense, 2002, http://history.defense.gov/resources/nss2002.pdf, 13. 
8 Rice quoted in Wolf Blitzer, “Search for the ‘Smoking Gun,’” CNN, January 10, 2003, http://www. 
cnn.com/2003/US/01/10/wbr.smoking.gun/. 
 3 
that protecting the nation from adversaries armed with nuclear weapons was its number 
one priority.9 In January 2012, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta listed “counter weapons 
of mass destruction” and “maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent” as two 
of the military’s 10 primary missions.10 In January 2014, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel 
ordered an extensive review of the military’s nuclear forces after a string of lapses called 
the reliability of these forces into question.11 
Intelligence estimates corroborate policymakers’ views that adversaries armed 
with nuclear weapons will continue to threaten the security of the United States and its 
allies. “The time when only a few states had access to the most dangerous technologies is 
past,” said National Intelligence Director James Clapper in 2014.12 In his 2013 statement 
to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Clapper discussed Iran’s nuclear 
capabilities and the dangers posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons and proliferation 
activities. He also warned that traditional nonproliferation efforts would not be as 
effective in preventing terrorist organizations from seeking WMD technologies as they 
have been in the past with many states.13 The proliferation of nuclear weapons has been 
recognized as a significant threat to U.S. national security since the Einstein letter to 
President Roosevelt in 1939. This letter marked the beginning of America’s participation 
in the international competition to develop nuclear weapons. 
                                                 
9 White House, National Security Strategy, The White House, May 2010, http://www.white 
house.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf, 4. 
10 Leon Panetta, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” U.S. 
Department of Defense, accessed February 23, 2014, http://www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_ 
guidance.pdf, 5. 
11 Jim Miklaszewski and Jeff Black, “Defense Secretary Hagel Orders Review of Nuclear Weapons 
Mission Following Scandals,” NBC News, January 23, 2014, 
http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2014/01/23/22418511-defense-secretary-hagel-orders-review-of-
nuclear-weapons-mission-following-scandals?lite. 
12 James R. Clapper, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. 
Intelligence Community,” U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, January 29, 2014, 
http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/140129/clapper.pdf, 5. 
13 James R. Clapper, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. 
Intelligence Community,” U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, March 12, 2013, 
http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/130312/clapper.pdf, 6–8. 
 4 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Four issues are likely to emerge in the search for the Army’s historical 
contributions to the nation’s nuclear undertakings. First, deconstructing U.S. nuclear 
history into distinguishable categories of contribution has been difficult in some 
instances, impossible in others. Throughout America’s nuclear past, many individuals 
and organizations have been responsible for building the nation’s nuclear infrastructure, 
shaping its security strategies, and influencing its policies pertaining to nuclear weapons. 
Although it is important to understand the specific roles and contributions of the U.S. 
Army, it is also important not to credit the Army with the accomplishments of others.  
Second, when studying an organization as large and diverse as the Army, 
constructing a uniform view of the Army’s role using the opinions and perceptions of its 
officers has been challenging. The Army is a hierarchical organization that acts with 
unity of effort; however, it does not think like a monolithic organization. While the 
Army’s “organizational essence” is grounded in land warfighting capacity, the Army is 
made up of many different branches and functional areas, each consisting of officers that 
perceive the Army’s role differently.14  
Third, the research question contains the term nuclear endeavors, which is an 
intentionally broad term. The Army has contributed to the U.S. nuclear infrastructure—
including the national laboratories—but it has also played a role in developing defense 
strategies and influencing policy over the years. It is the intent of this research to 
determine the extent of the Army’s contributions in all of these categories, even at the 
expense of sacrificing some detail in explaining each one.  
Finally, compared to the volume of theoretical, academic, and strategic studies 
regarding the roles of nuclear weapons and the reasons for nuclear proliferation, little has 
been said specifically about the Army’s role in the nuclear field. Nevertheless, the 
literature review provides an analysis of the major historical works relevant to the subject 
of this research as well as a review of the past professional nuclear debate.  
                                                 
14 Morton H. Halperin and Priscilla A. Clapp, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, 2nd ed. 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), 27, 32–33. 
 5 
This thesis considered two plausible answers to the research question. The first 
hypothesis holds that the Army was involved in the establishment of the nation’s nuclear 
infrastructure but that its nuclear role diminished over time as its sister services, 
particularly the Air Force and the Navy, assumed primary responsibility for the nation’s 
strategic weapons. The Army struggled throughout the Cold War to retain a nuclear 
function. Its weapons and doctrine were increasingly regarded as impractical, and the 
service was eventually forced to abandon its atomic arsenal. Today, the Army is 
attempting to maintain nuclear relevance; however, it does not play as great a role in the 
nation’s nuclear endeavors as the Air Force and the Navy. 
The alternative hypothesis suggests that the Army has played a significant role 
throughout U.S. nuclear history. In addition to supervising the construction of the world’s 
first nuclear weapons and using two of them in combat, the Army played a leading role in 
developing U.S. strategy and embraced nuclear delivery missions. The Army developed 
tactical weapons at a time when nuclear warfare appeared to be highly probable, but it 
was one of the first services (along with the U.S. Marine Corps) to relinquish its nuclear 
arsenal once the specter of nuclear war seemed to have passed. Although certain facts 
support elements of the first hypothesis, this thesis has concluded that the Army has taken 
on an active role in nonproliferation and counterproliferation efforts, in developing 
nuclear strategy, and that the Army continues to play an important role in the nation’s 
nuclear endeavors. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Many historical works concerning the development of nuclear arms begin with 
accounts of the world’s most renowned physics laureate, Albert Einstein, who, upon the 
recommendation of fellow scientists, signed a letter addressed to Franklin D. Roosevelt 
warning the President about Germany’s interest in uranium, as well as the element’s 
 6 
potential for fueling “extremely powerful bombs of a new type.”15 Richard Rhodes’s 
Pulitzer Prize-winning The Making of the Atomic Bomb offers a detailed history of the 
development of the atomic bomb, but the book primarily focuses on the scientists 
involved in the Manhattan Project, particularly Dr. Leo Szilard.16 On the other hand, the 
Senior Fellow for Nuclear Policy for the Federation of American Scientists, Dr. Robert S. 
Norris, points out that many of the literary works concerning the Manhattan Project 
overlook the indispensable contributions of General Leslie R. Groves, the Army officer 
ultimately responsible for the colossal task.17 “Without Groves’s vision, drive, and 
administrative ability, it is highly unlikely that the atomic bomb would have been 
completed when it was,” writes Norris, whose biography of Groves sheds light on the 
vital role that the general played in the bomb’s development and use.18  
Vincent Jones’s 1985 history of the Manhattan Project reveals the depth of the 
Army’s involvement in the pursuit of the world’s first successful nuclear weapons 
program. It shows that, although Army leaders were initially reluctant to pursue nuclear 
weapons for fiscal reasons, the U.S. Army went on to play a crucial role in the 
development of the atomic bomb—at a time when it was simultaneously fighting in the 
largest war of all time.19  
                                                 
15 “Albert Einstein to F. D. Roosevelt, August 2, 1939,” in The Manhattan Project: A Documentary 
Introduction to the Atomic Age, ed. Michael B. Stoff, Jonathan F. Fanton, and R. Hal Williams 
(Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1991), 18–19. Examples of books concerning the development 
of nuclear weapons in which Einstein is mentioned near the books’ beginnings include Arthur Holly 
Compton, Atomic Quest: A Personal Narrative (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), 27; William L. 
Laurence, Men and Atoms: The Discovery, the Uses, and the Future of Atomic Energy (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1959), 56; Robert Jungk, Brighter than a Thousand Suns: A Personal History of the Atomic 
Scientists, trans. James Cleugh (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1958), 85; Alwyn McKay, The 
Making of the Atomic Age (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 43; Leona Marshall Libby, The 
Uranium People (New York: Crane, Russak and Company, 1979), 69; Donald M. Goldstein, Katherine V. 
Dillon, and J. Michael Wenger, Rain of Ruin: A Photographic History of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
(Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1995), 1. 
16 Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 
1986). 
17 “Norris, Robert Standish,” Federation of American Scientists, accessed November 23, 2013, 
http://www.fas.org/press/experts/norris.html; Robert S. Norris, Racing for the Bomb: General Leslie R. 
Groves, The Manhattan Project’s Indispensable Man (South Royalton, VT: Steerforth Press, 2002), ix.  
18 Norris, Racing for the Bomb, x, 545–46. 
19 Vincent C. Jones, Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb (Washington, DC: Center of Military 
History, 1985), ix, vii, 20–21. 
 7 
Jones’s official history draws upon the earlier work of Richard G. Hewlett and 
Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., whose book, The New World, 1939/1946, also provides a detailed 
history of the Manhattan Project and serves as the first volume in a series of three official 
histories concerning the Atomic Energy Commission. Atomic Shield, 1947/1952, the 
second volume in the series, shows the extent of the Army’s influence on the nation’s 
nuclear infrastructure during the early years of the Cold War. It also covers the early 
relationship between the military and the newly established, civilian-led commission and 
the debate regarding the military services’ roles in national nuclear activities. The third 
volume in the series, however, bears little relevance to the subject of this research.20  
Gregg Herken asserts that most Army planners overlooked the implications of 
nuclear weapons, although his book later provides an example that suggests otherwise. 
He writes that General George Marshall believed that nuclear warfare would place a 
greater demand on the support units tasked with supplying combat forces dispersed 
across the nuclear battlefield.21 Herken’s description of the Army’s perceptions of 
nuclear weapons during the early stages of the Cold War is not quite as nuanced as David 
A. Rosenberg’s account of the evolution of Army Cold War nuclear strategy. Rosenberg 
points out that, until 1947, Army leaders—specifically Generals Eisenhower and 
Groves—were among the few actually aware of the size and composition of the nation’s 
nuclear stockpile.22 Furthermore, throughout the Eisenhower administration, Army 
officers, such as Generals Ridgway and Taylor were prominent participants in the 
strategic debate, challenging President Eisenhower’s notion of massive retaliation.23 
President John F. Kennedy appointed General Taylor to serve as Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. 
                                                 
20 Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., ed., The New World, 1939/1946, vol. 1 of A History 
of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1962); Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, ed., Atomic Shield, 1947/1952, vol. 2 of A History of the 
United States Atomic Energy Commission (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1969); Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, Atoms for Peace and War 1953–1961: Eisenhower and the 
Atomic Energy Commission (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989). 
21 Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945–1950 (New York: 
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Glenn Hastedt’s ninth edition of American Foreign Policy provides a brief but 
somewhat useful discussion of the evolution of U.S. nuclear strategy before and after the 
Cold War. Hastedt claims, however, that President George W. Bush “introduced 
preemption” and rejected the notion of nuclear deterrence, assertions that Marc 
Trachtenberg refutes in his chapter about the history of preemption.24 
Throughout the late-1970s and 1980s, defense professionals debated the Army’s 
nuclear capabilities. Major John P. Rose stated in 1980 that the Army’s doctrine closely 
followed national policy throughout much of the Cold War, and he maintained that the 
Army should be prepared for a tactical nuclear exchange with Soviet forces in Europe.25 
“The development of tactical doctrine need not depend upon political leaders,” wrote 
Rose, who went on to say, “Given the nuclear orientation of the Soviet threat, there is no 
excuse for the lack of concentrated training in tactical nuclear warfare.”26  
Captain John J. Midgley contended in 1986 that the Army’s nuclear weapons 
were too expensive and of little value. In his view, conventional weapons could perform 
the same functions as tactical nuclear ones. “The Army has procured weapons which it 
cannot use,” he said, calling for a reduction in tactical nuclear weapons.27 His 1986 book 
reviews the Army’s nuclear policy and concludes, “current Army initiatives appear to be 
based on a desire to incorporate advanced technology without detailed analysis of its 
military effectiveness.”28  
Lieutenant Colonel A. J. Bacevich argued in 1986 that the Army had adopted an 
inappropriate nuclear role because it faced an organizational crisis of survival in the 
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1950s.29 Instead of relying on nuclear firepower capabilities as it did, the Army would 
have been better off by embracing conventional-style intervention, according to 
Bacevich.30 He believed that the Army’s nuclear role in the early Cold War was the result 
of President Eisenhower’s defense strategy.31 Bacevich’s book, The Pentomic Era: The 
U.S. Army between Korea and Vietnam, traces the evolution of Army doctrine during 
much of the Cold War and showcases the debate within the service over its role in 
nuclear warfare. 
Today, the debate about whether the Army needs its own nuclear arsenal is over. 
By the end of the Cold War, Army officers like Lieutenant John D. Skelton were 
beginning to voice their belief that the Army no longer needed nuclear weapons. In 1991, 
Skelton held that joint targeting procedures should give the Army a vote in the 
employment of nuclear weapons, but he believed that the Army’s tactical nuclear 
missions needed to be relinquished to Air Force and Navy control.32 By the early 1990s, 
a new concept was beginning to emerge. While Leonard Spector believed that military 
intervention should be a last resort, his 1992 paper for the U.S. Army’s Strategic Studies 
Institute held that “the option of using military force to halt nuclear proliferation should 
be retained.”33 This implied a possible nuclear-related role for the Army—intervening to 
halt the spread of nuclear weapons. Although this concept was not entirely new, 
counterproliferation went on to become a new mission for America’s military forces.34 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
Each chapter of this historical study relies heavily on primary and secondary 
historical sources. Some of the research entailed examining memoirs from participants in 
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the nation’s nuclear past, especially those of senior Army officers. General Dwight D. 
Eisenhower published his war memoirs in 1948,35 General Leslie R. Groves released 
Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project in 1962, seventeen years after 
the first nuclear explosion,36 and General Maxwell D. Taylor published The Uncertain 
Trumpet in 1959.37 Official histories, such as the U.S. Army’s Manhattan: The Army and 
the Atomic Bomb by Vincent C. Jones and the official history of the Atomic Energy 
Commission, provided a great deal of information about the Manhattan Project and the 
nuclear program during the early years of the Cold War.  
Many of the details concerning the Army’s past deployments of nuclear weapons 
are available through declassified sources, although details about dates and numbers were 
difficult to find since much has been redacted and remains classified. Frequently cited 
published sources include Robert S. Norris’s articles—”United States Nuclear Weapons 
Deployments Abroad, 1950–1977” and “Where They Were,” written with William Arkin 
and William Burr. These sources provide the views of the authors regarding U.S. nuclear 
weapons deployments throughout Europe and Asia from 1950 to 1977.38  
Declassified reporting from the Manhattan Engineer District also reveals the 
extent of the destruction from the bombs used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki and supplies 
details about the Atomic Bomb Investigating Group. Unclassified information from 
Department of the Army manuals, pamphlets, and briefings was helpful when examining 
the work of the Army’s contemporary nuclear soldiers, as were the Army’s digital 
archives, Public Affairs Office publications, and other online sources. Finally, some of 
the views of Army officers past and present came from reports and research generated 
from service schools. 
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F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis is organized primarily in chronological order, although several sections 
in the thesis cover concurrent time periods—for example, the section about Cold War 
deployments to Europe is followed by one discussing deployments to Asia during the 
same time period. After this introduction, the thesis discusses the Army’s participation in 
the Manhattan Project. This chapter provides an overview and history of the project and 
discusses the specific Army organizations involved in the process of building and using 
the world’s first nuclear weapons. It also considers the views of some of the Army’s 
senior officers. The next chapter covers the Army’s nuclear activities during the Cold 
War. It reviews the interservice struggle for nuclear roles, the development of the Army’s 
nuclear arsenal, and other practical tasks: education, training, testing, and doctrine. The 
chapter also examines the Pentomic Army and the deployment of the Army’s nuclear 
weapons to bases in Europe and Asia. The next chapter takes up the end of the Cold War, 
the changes to the Army’s nuclear forces, and the Army’s nuclear missions today. 
Finally, the thesis concludes with a summary of the principal findings of the research. 
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II. ATOMS FOR WAR: THE U.S. ARMY’S ROLE IN THE 
MANHATTAN PROJECT 
The striking success of this project was made possible by the work and 
sacrifices of the military personnel.  
—J. Robert Oppenheimer39 
For many people, hearing the words Manhattan Project evokes images of brilliant 
scientists: Compton, Fermi, Lawrence, Oppenheimer, Szilard, Teller, or Wigner, or 
leaders of scientific and technological organizations, such as James Conant, the Chairman 
of the National Defense Research Committee, or Vannevar Bush, Director of the Office 
of Scientific Research and Development, not U.S. Army soldiers. Many history books 
that describe the development of nuclear weapons begin with discussions of the 
acclaimed physicist Albert Einstein, who, upon the recommendation of fellow scientists, 
in 1939 signed a letter addressed to Franklin D. Roosevelt warning the President of 
Germany’s interest in uranium as well as the element’s potential for fueling “extremely 
powerful bombs of a new type.”40 Physicist and Nobel laureate Arthur Holly Compton 
appropriately dedicated his Atomic Quest: A Personal Narrative to “many minds and 
many hands,” yet the focus of the author’s 1956 book is, admittedly, the group of 
scientists involved in the creation of atomic weapons.41 It has been well documented, 
however, that they were not the only scientists in the world to understand the process of 
nuclear fission—or its implications.42 “Scientists throughout the world launched a 
comprehensive effort to throw light on the phenomenon of fission,” wrote Richard 
Hewlett and Oscar Anderson, who pointed out that there had been close to one hundred 
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articles about nuclear fission published worldwide before 1940.43 What is missing in the 
historical accounts of the Manhattan Project is the integral role played by the U.S. Army 
in developing the world’s first nuclear weapons. Most of these histories fail to capture the 
full extent of the contributions made by the nation’s soldiers.  
What made the United States different from other countries and allowed it to 
become the first to produce nuclear weapons was not its scientific superiority, but its 
unparalleled industrial capacity, which was harnessed and directed by the U.S. Army to 
accomplish the most difficult and time-consuming task involved in the development of 
nuclear weapons—producing enough fissile material to reach critical mass.44 Historian 
Robert S. Norris points out that many of the literary works concerning the Manhattan 
Project overlook the indispensable contributions of General Leslie R. Groves, the Army 
officer ultimately responsible for the colossal task.45 Although the Army would never 
have been able to construct a nuclear bomb without the contributions of dedicated and 
ingenious civilian scientists, engineers, and technicians or the financial support of U.S. 
taxpayers, historical accounts of the Manhattan Project that fail to mention the U.S. 
Army’s significant role in the development of nuclear weapons are incomplete. 
Since the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, nuclear weapons have occupied a 
prominent position in U.S. foreign policy, and nuclear issues have pervaded much of the 
world’s international relations. It is important to understand clearly how the military—the 
executor of warfare, nuclear or otherwise—perceives nuclear warfare and the roles of 
nuclear weapons in the security of the nation and its allies. As an organization, the U.S. 
Army was slow to explore the possible military applications of nuclear energy but quick 
to produce nuclear weapons once given the assignment.46 Individually, however, the 
Army’s top officers held different views regarding whether the atomic bombs should 
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have been used.47 This chapter examines the role of the U.S. Army in America’s pursuit 
of nuclear weapons during World War II. It begins with an overview of the Manhattan 
Project, followed by a history of the Army’s early atomic work. The chapter then 
discusses the Army personnel and organizations involved in the project, and, finally, it 
explores the different views held by senior Army officers concerning the world’s first 
atomic weapons.  
A. OVERVIEW OF THE MANHATTAN PROJECT: AN ARMY 
PERSPECTIVE 
The Manhattan Project was a massive undertaking that succeeded in transforming 
scientific theories into functioning strategic weapons. Physicist Robert Serber of the 
Manhattan Project aptly described the project’s primary mission: “To produce a practical 
military weapon in the form of a bomb in which the energy is released by a fast neutron 
chain reaction in one or more of the materials known to show nuclear fission.”48 The 
former Chief of Military History for the United States Army Center of Military History, 
Brigadier General (Ret.) Douglas Kinnard, described the Manhattan Project as “the 
World War II organization which produced the atomic bombs that not only contributed 
decisively to ending the war with Japan but also opened the way to a new atomic age.”49 
More specifically, the Manhattan Project was a top secret Army organization that was 
led, funded, and administered by the United States Army Corps of Engineers’ Manhattan 
Engineer District (MED) and relied upon the efforts of many people—civilians and 
service members alike—to produce America’s first atomic arsenal as well as its initial 
nuclear infrastructure. 
Named after the initial location of the project’s temporary headquarters in New 
York City, the Manhattan Project was led and administered by the U.S. Army.50 The 
                                                 
47 Norris, Racing for the Bomb, 426–27; Robert James Maddox, Weapons for Victory: The Hiroshima 
Decision Fifty Years Later (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1995), 140–141; Gar Alperovitz, 
The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 334–365, 548. 
48 Robert Serber, “The Los Alamos Primer,” Los Alamos National Laboratory Research Library, U.S. 
Department of Energy, accessed July 4, 2014, http://library.lanl.gov/cgi-bin/getfile?00349710.pdf, 1.  
49 Jones, Manhattan, vii. 
50 Ibid., 39, 41–44; Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, 73–74; Peter Bacon Hales, Atomic 
Spaces: Living on the Manhattan Project (Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1997), 1. 
 16 
project spanned four and a half years from the day it was assigned to the Army on June 
17, 1942, until the Army transferred control of the nation’s nuclear program to the newly 
established Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) on December 31, 1946.51 Between 
November 1939 and October 1940, the U.S. government allocated a mere $6,000 to the 
study of nuclear fission, half of which was provided by the U.S. Army; yet by the time 
World War II was over the U.S. Army had secretly spent $2 billion on the project—over 
$26 billion in today’s dollars.52 At the beginning of the Manhattan Project, rural 
Americans were displaced by the Army Corps of Engineers to make room for the creation 
of three new, secret U.S. cities;53 by the end of the project, the Army Air Force had 
destroyed two Japanese cities.  
Despite its many successes, the Manhattan Project was an incredibly risky and 
ambitious endeavor. Until the first nuclear test on the morning of July 16, 1945, scientists 
were still uncertain if the fission chain reaction would result in a global catastrophe, 
either by consuming the atmosphere or by disrupting Earth’s orbital path around the 
sun.54 The gun-type nuclear weapon that devastated Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, 
named Little Boy, was composed of uranium that had been enriched at a newly 
constructed secret facility in Oak Ridge, Tennessee.55 Before that day, the workings of 
that particular design were entirely theoretical, as it had never actually been tested.56 The 
first nuclear explosive test, conducted with the code name Trinity near Alamogordo, New 
Mexico, on July 16, 1945, was the product of a completely different design—an 
implosion-type device based on plutonium.57 The success of the Trinity test paved the 
way for the Fat Man bomb dropped on Nagasaki three days after the Hiroshima bombing. 
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The fuel for the Trinity test and the Fat Man bomb was produced at the project’s Hanford 
site near Richland, Washington.58 The Army Corps of Engineers selected this site based 
on its ideal location; like Oak Ridge, Hanford was in an isolated location near sources of 
water and electricity.59 As with many East Tennesseans, the rural people of Hanford and 
the surrounding communities were evicted from their homes to make room for the 
production facilities after Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson authorized the 
Army to purchase or lease the land required for the Manhattan Project.60 A similar story 
unfolded in Los Alamos, New Mexico, where teams of engineers and scientists worked to 
design the bombs.61 The Army Corps of Engineers needed a remote location surrounded 
by high ground; nevertheless, they needed it also to be accessible.62 Following the 
recommendation of J. Robert Oppenheimer, the Army chose the Los Alamos Ranch 
School and, in one month’s time, began introducing demolition and construction 
equipment into the area in preparation for breaking ground at the new project site.63 
Soon, scientists and engineers at Los Alamos were busy designing atomic bombs without 
knowing for certain if the United States—or anyone, for that matter—could accumulate 
enough fissile material to initiate an explosive nuclear chain reaction.64 At the time, 
uranium was thought to be extremely rare. 
By the beginning of 1943, construction was underway at all three main Manhattan 
Project sites.65 As laborers, scientists, and soldiers continued to arrive at each location, 
the populations eventually grew to exceed initial expectations. In 1942, only 13.000 
people were expected to live at the Oak Ridge site; however, by 1945, Oak Ridge became 
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Tennessee’s fifth largest city, with approximately seventy-five thousand residents.66 
Early estimates for the Los Alamos workforce ranged from between 265 to 600 
personnel, yet by the end of the war, the Los Alamos population had reached nearly 
7,000.67 Development plans at the Hanford site in the spring of 1943 called for fewer 
than a thousand houses and additional dormitory accommodations for 6,500 people; by 
the summer of 1945, there were 17,500 residents in Richland and over 4,000 houses.68 
Although the number of workers drastically declined after the Japanese surrendered, the 
Army officer in charge of the Manhattan Project, Leslie Groves, drew up a plan that 
would have long-lasting effects. He proposed to streamline atomic operations, continue 
the production of fissile materials, and increase the nation’s nuclear weapons arsenal.69 
For decades after the end of the war, workers continued development at each of the 
sites.70 The Manhattan Project, which originated as an endeavor to prevent Nazi 
Germany from being the first country to gain access to the most powerful weapon ever 
imagined, was responsible for the creation and destruction of cities; it helped to establish 
new forms of industry, energy, strategy, and policy; and it was a landmark in the 
international nuclear arms race that began in the late 1930s. 
B. HISTORY OF THE MANHATTAN PROJECT: FAST MARCH TO THE 
BOMB 
The U.S. military began funding civilian research into uranium fission as early as 
January 1940.71 Once scientists were satisfied that explosive fission was possible and that 
fissile materials could be amassed, James Conant and Vannevar Bush recommended that 
the Army be given a more prominent role in the development process.72 Just as scientists 
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were beginning the early stages of uranium enrichment in the summer of 1942, President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt officially made the U.S. Army responsible for America’s atomic 
program, which came to be known as the Manhattan Engineer District (MED).73 Initially, 
Colonel James C. Marshall was appointed as the head of the program, and Colonel 
Kenneth D. Nichols, who was later tasked with developing the MED’s gaseous diffusion 
plant, became the deputy district engineer.74 Following frustrating project delays, 
however, General George C. Marshall and Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell 
replaced Colonel Marshall with a more dynamic officer, Colonel Leslie Groves, on 
September 17, 1942.75  
Groves and his team quickly took action. During his first day commanding the 
MED, Groves ordered his deputy to locate a supply of uranium.76 Colonel Nichols 
immediately departed for New York, where he purchased over twelve hundred tons of 
uranium ore by the end of the following day.77 On September 19, 1942, Colonel Groves 
met with the head of the War Production Board, Donald Nelson, to receive a higher 
resource priority rating than had been granted to his predecessor.78 According to Groves, 
despite Nelson’s initial reluctance, the Manhattan Project leader was able to secure a 
higher rating after threatening, “to recommend to the President that the project should be 
abandoned because the War Production Board was unwilling to co-operate with his 
wishes.”79 On September 23, newly-promoted Brigadier General Groves appeared at a 
meeting convened by Secretary of War Henry Stimson and attended by top defense 
officials—General George Marshall, the Chief of Staff of the Army, Lieutenant General 
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 Brehon Somervell, Head of Army Service Forces, and Somervell’s chief of staff, Major 
General Wilhelm D. Styer, as well as the heads of national research, Vannevar Bush and 
James Conant.80  
Despite his subordinate position in relation to other attendees, Groves abruptly 
left during the middle of the meeting, went to East Tennessee, and ordered the Real 
Estate Division of the Corps of Engineers to begin acquiring the nearly sixty square miles 
needed to build the MED’s massive uranium enrichment facilities.81 The Oak Ridge site 
in Tennessee, also known as the Clinton Engineer Works (CEW), was the first of three 
main locations requisitioned by the Corps of Engineers.82 Just two weeks after Groves’s 
order, the Corps of Engineers began sending out eviction notices to the Oak Ridge 
residents, instructing them to vacate their homes as early as the first of December, 
1942.83 By February 1943, the MED had also taken full custody of the Los Alamos 
Ranch School in New Mexico and acquired another 650,000 acres in Hanford, 
Washington.84  
For the next two and a half years, an army of physicists, chemists, engineers, 
construction workers, drivers, technicians, clerical workers, and—among others—Army 
soldiers worked to develop nuclear weapons before America’s enemies were able to do 
so. Shortly before the MED reached its goal of producing a fission bomb, President 
Roosevelt passed away on April 12, 1945. Less than two weeks later, Stimson and 
Groves met with President Harry Truman, who had not been included in discussions 
about the Manhattan Project prior to that time, to brief him on the status of the nuclear 
program.85 After a meeting between the President and General Marshall that same month, 
the Army Chief of Staff tasked Groves with developing a list of possible target locations 
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on which to drop the bombs.86 General Groves went to work, establishing a targeting 
committee, selecting target locations, preparing operations plans for the bombings, and, 
eventually, writing the official directive to drop the atomic bombs.87 Whether by the 
direction of his superiors or simply by his force of character, Groves put the Army in the 
center of every major component of the atomic bomb project.  
General Groves, who believed that the atomic bombs should be used against 
Japanese cities without advance warning, also provided his advice to the Interim 
Committee, a group of government officials, scholars, and businessmen assembled by 
Secretary Stimson to provide information and advice to the President on matters 
pertaining to the use of nuclear energy.88 Groves also informed Secretary Stimson that a 
group of scientists was growing concerned about the use of the atomic bomb once it 
became clear that its use was no longer required to defeat Hitler’s forces.89 At the Interim 
Committee’s meeting on June 21, 1945, members discussed two competing views 
regarding the first use of the atomic bomb.90  
One group of scientists, headed by James Franck, opposed the unannounced use 
of atomic bombs against Japan and urged that the bomb’s existence be revealed in a 
public demonstration.91 In its report, the group said, “If the United States would be the 
first to release this new means of indiscriminate destruction upon mankind, she would 
sacrifice public support throughout the world, precipitate the race of armaments, and 
prejudice the possibility of reaching an international agreement on the future control of 
such weapons.”92  
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Franck’s group was challenged by the Interim Committee’s scientific panel, 
whose members concluded that, despite their own internal disagreements regarding how 
the bomb should be used, they saw “no acceptable alternative to direct military use.”93 
Ultimately, the views of the Interim Committee’s scientific panel and General Groves 
prevailed. The Interim Committee recommended that the weapons be “used against Japan 
at the earliest opportunity…without warning.”94 
On July 16, 1945, in the desert near Alamogordo, New Mexico, the U.S. Army 
supervised humanity’s first nuclear explosion. Logistics for the secret test included 
transporting the massive test device to the range, assembling the test facilities, and 
gathering the scientists for the Trinity event.95 Five days later, Secretary Stimson 
received a thorough report from General Groves describing the results of the successful 
atomic test. On July 25, 1945, the President, the Secretary of War, and the Chief of Staff 
of the Army approved the orders to use atomic bombs on a select group of targets in 
Japan.96 Two months earlier, Groves and a special committee designated the target 
locations, with the exception of Nagasaki, which was later chosen as a substitute target 
after Secretary of War Stimson had rejected Groves’s repeated proposals to strike Kyoto 
on the grounds that the ancient city was too culturally significant to destroy.97 
Additionally, in the months leading up to August 1945, the Army Air Force secretly 
established, trained, and deployed the 509th Composite Group, the Army’s B-29 unit 
based at Tinian Island, in the Pacific, that was responsible for dropping the atomic bombs 
on their designated targets.98 
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On August 6, 1945, Little Boy detonated over Hiroshima, creating an explosion 
equal to nearly 12,500 tons of TNT and killing between 66,000 and 80,000 people.99 
Japan’s emperor, however, did not surrender, and U.S. military and civilian leaders 
continued to prepare for prolonged hostilities in Asia, including the invasion of Japan’s 
main islands.100 Three days later, Fat Man destroyed Nagasaki and claimed the lives of 
between 23,000 and 45,000 people with a yield of nearly 22,000 tons of TNT.101 On 
August 14, Japanese officials sent a message to President Truman declaring their 
acceptance of the terms of surrender.102  
Following the war, the U.S. Army continued to head the nation’s atomic program, 
examining the effects of the bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, investigating the 
progress of the wartime nuclear programs in Germany and Japan, and gradually taking 
measures to transform America’s wartime atomic operation into a peacetime program.103 
Within a year’s time, President Truman signed the Atomic Energy Act, which created the 
Atomic Energy Commission, the civilian agency that would assume responsibility for the 
atomic energy program.104  
Prior to the President’s signing of the Atomic Energy Act, General Groves told 
the Senate Special Committee on Atomic Energy that the Army could “furnish invaluable 
assistance” to future stewards of America’s nuclear program.105 “Civilian and military 
personnel who have acquired knowledge and experience on the project should continue to 
serve to the extent that their services are useful,” said Groves.106 On December 31, 1946, 
Groves and Nichols met with AEC commissioners at the White House to watch as 
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Truman signed the executive order that transferred peacetime control of the program to 
the AEC and marked the end of the Manhattan Project.107 In addition to relinquishing 
control of the program to the AEC and transferring ownership of 37 military installations 
to the civilian commission, the Army also provided the new supervisors of the nation’s 
nuclear program with a cadre of nearly 2,000 U.S. troops and 4,000 U.S. government 
civilian employees to provide continuity to the program, just as Groves had called for a 
year earlier.108  
C. ARMY PERSONNEL AND ORGANIZATIONS WITHIN THE MED 
We became accustomed to administrators and doctors in uniform, Wacs 
selling sodas and checking groceries, selling postage stamps and cashing 
checks, and military police with guns guarding fences and gates and 
keeping our comings and goings under their watchful eyes. 
—Bernice Brode, Manhattan Project worker and wife of physicist Robert 
Brode109 
In addition to the officers and soldiers serving in the Army Corps of Engineers—
the organization primarily responsible for the Manhattan Project—and the many Military 
Policemen (MPs), medical personnel, logisticians, and Signal Corps soldiers working on 
the Manhattan Project, Army personnel assigned to the MED included members of the 
Special Engineer Detachment (SED), the Women’s Army Corps (WAC) Detachment, the 
Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) Detachment, and the Atomic Bomb Investigating 
Group.110 These soldiers were essential to the success of the Manhattan Project, serving 
in clerical and administrative positions, fulfilling scientific and technical roles, guarding 
the sensitive facilities, protecting the nation’s highest secrets, and providing essential 
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resources and services at a time of severe shortages and national rationing.111 Near the 
end of the war, hundreds of military officers and roughly 5,000 enlisted personnel were 
assigned to the Manhattan Project.112 The following subsections discuss the contributions 
of some of the Army personnel and organizations serving in the nation’s fledgling atomic 
program. 
1. The Special Engineer Detachment 
In scanning the account of the Manhattan Project by our commanding 
general (Leslie R. Groves, Now It Can Be Told) I have not found where 
SEDs are even mentioned. Clearly we were not the low men on the totem 
pole. As carved by our commanding general, we were not on the totem at 
all. 
—Val L. Fitch, former SED soldier113 
By the spring of 1943, as the Manhattan Project continued to expand, MED 
leaders were beginning to realize that they would soon be faced with shortages in 
personnel, particularly those with scientific and technical expertise, as the secret nuclear 
program competed with the regular military’s selective service system for new 
recruits.114 The MED responded to this challenge by establishing a new Army outfit in 
May 1943 that would be organized under the MED and composed of draftees with 
valuable technical skills, experience, and education.115 As the year progressed, the MED 
began recruiting scientists, engineers, mechanics, machinists, technicians, and other 
skilled personnel from across the nation to fulfill the MED’s initial request for nearly 700 
soldiers for assignment in the newly established Special Engineer Detachment (SED).116 
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Known as “SEDs,” these soldiers served at a number of MED labs, shops, and project 
sites, including those at Oak Ridge and Los Alamos.117  
According to former SED soldier Benjamin Bederson, “The role played by the 
common U.S. soldier in the development of atomic weapons during World War II is not 
generally appreciated.”118 Although the service of the SED soldiers has received little 
attention in many of the accounts of the Manhattan Project, the SEDs played a vital role 
in the development of America’s first nuclear weapons. At its peak, the SED had over 
1,800 soldiers, some with doctoral degrees in science and engineering and nearly 30 
percent with undergraduate degrees.119 According to Hewlett and Anderson, scientific 
leaders at the Los Alamos site had been reluctant to accept additional military personnel; 
nevertheless, as manpower shortages became more severe, they had no choice but to rely 
upon the efforts and expertise of the soldier scientists.120 By August 1944, a third of the 
Los Alamos scientific cadre consisted of Army soldiers;121 the following May, the 
number of civilian laboratory workers at Los Alamos nearly equaled the number of SEDs 
working there.122 The SEDs worked long hours, six days per week; they conducted 
regular drills and inspections in addition to their scientific and technical work; they were 
subject to strict Army regulations; and they were paid enlisted salaries.123 In spite of 
these requirements, the soldiers of the SED contributed significantly to the Manhattan 
Project, ensuring that the shorthanded scientific staffs were able to fulfill their duties and 
produce nuclear weapons before an invasion of Japan’s main islands claimed the lives of 
even more allied troops.  
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2. The Women’s Army Corps Detachment 
In the summer of 1943, the U.S. government formed another new Army 
organization, the Women’s Army Corps (WAC).124 Just two years earlier, as a result of 
the efforts of Congresswoman Edith Rogers (R-MA) and the influence of General George 
C. Marshall, Washington approved the establishment of the Women’s Army Auxiliary 
Corps (WAAC), the predecessor of the WAC.125 In the foreword of Vera S. Williams’s 
book WACs: Women’s Army Corps, Colonel (Ret.) Bettie Morden, former WAAC and 
WAC, observes that the Corps was not created as a social experiment or even as a 
political maneuver; it was done out of necessity, as there were not enough qualified males 
available to accomplish the nation’s tasks.126 The Manhattan Project was no exception. 
When the amount of work increased significantly in 1943, the Army authorized the 
establishment of a new unit consisting of seventy-five servicewomen that came to be 
known as the Manhattan District WAC Detachment.127 Ruth Howes and Caroline 
Herzenberg argue that, without women, including the members of the WAC, the 
Manhattan Project would not have succeeded.128 
Female soldiers were assigned to each of the Manhattan Project’s three main 
locations.129 The detachments quickly reached their personnel limit; however, as the 
work load increased, so did the authorizations for additional personnel.130 At the Hanford 
site, a company of WAC soldiers was assigned administrative duties while another 
section of servicewomen performed production work.131 By May 1945, nearly half of the 
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67-member Los Alamos detachment was performing scientific work.132 Three months 
later, 260 WAC soldiers were serving in a number of capacities at the New Mexico 
site.133 Oak Ridge became the District WAC Detachment’s headquarters, performing 
administrative duties for the servicewomen at six locations across the United States.134 
By the war’s end, over four hundred women were serving in the Manhattan District WAC 
Detachment.135 
Although many of the WACs served in clerical or non-technical positions, some 
of the servicewomen were involved in the scientific and technical aspects of the 
project.136 Private Mary Miller, Ph.D., a chemist who refused promotion despite her 
credentials and level of responsibility, directed one of the Los Alamos chemistry 
laboratories.137 Second Lieutenant Myrtle Bachelder served simultaneously as a chemist 
and as a company commander.138 J. Robert Oppenheimer commended Private Lynda 
Speck for her work in neutron energy measurement;139 Master Sergeant Elizabeth Wilson 
assisted with the cyclotron,140 and architect Miriam White Campbell worked on design 
drawings for Little Boy.141  
As for their performance, a number of top defense officials lauded the wartime 
service of the WACs. General Douglas MacArthur said that the WACs were his “best 
soldiers.”142 Major General Wilhelm Styer praised them for their courage and work ethic, 
Lieutenant General George Kenney recognized the quality of their work and the role they 
played in the nation’s war effort, and Major General Clements McMullen called their 
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departure “a distinct loss to the command.”143 Throughout the entire U.S. war effort, 
WAC contributions proved critical; nowhere was this more apparent than in the MED. 
The MED’s WAC Detachment, eventually designated as the 9812th Technical Service 
Unit, Corps of Engineers, was awarded the Meritorious Service Unit Award for its 
superior performance of duties.144 Overall, the WACs not only played a vital role in the 
development of America’s first nuclear arsenal, but they also left a lasting legacy, which 
paved the way for the women serving in today’s gender-integrated U.S. Army.145 
3. The Counterintelligence Corps Detachment 
We faced the definite possibility that Germany would produce a nuclear 
weapon before we could. For that reason it was absolutely essential for us 
to remain as fully informed as possible on German progress in this field. 
—Lieutenant General (Ret.) Leslie R. Groves146 
One of the reasons why the Army was chosen to head the U.S. nuclear program 
was the belief that the Army was the organization best suited to protect the nation’s most 
sensitive secrets.147 Early in the Manhattan Project, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Major 
General George Strong assigned Major John Lansdale as the officer in charge of the 
MED’s security and counterintelligence operations.148 As the Manhattan Project grew 
and the need to protect information became more important, the MED eventually formed 
an organic Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) Detachment to accomplish two crucial 
missions: to detect and to prevent both nuclear espionage and the sabotage of nuclear 
facilities.149  
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Eventually, the MED’s CIC Detachment consisted of eleven offices spread across 
the United States.150 In addition to conducting background investigations and issuing 
security clearances, CIC agents, known as “creeps,” conducted surveillance on 
Manhattan Project employees, tapping telephone lines to listen in on private 
conversations, snapping photographs with concealed cameras, and eavesdropping with 
listening devices.151 These agents also went about the project locations incognito, posing 
as hospitality workers, gamblers, construction workers, bartenders, and bus drivers in 
order to listen in on the conversations of project workers and thereby both uncover spies 
and silence loose lips.152 CIC soldiers also investigated every mechanical breakdown and 
accident on the project to rule out the possibility of sabotage.153  
Ultimately, spies were able to steal America’s nuclear secrets. This sped the 
demise of the U.S. nuclear monopoly and laid the foundation for Cold War excesses, 
such as the persecution of J. Robert Oppenheimer.154 Joseph Albright and Marcia 
Kunstel criticize the MED’s counterintelligence soldiers, claiming that the military did 
not conduct effective background checks and pointing out that no case investigated by the 
CIC Detachment ever resulted in a criminal prosecution.155 “All three known spies at Los 
Alamos,” the authors write, “had been members of the Communist Party or offshoots of 
it, yet the CIC wasn’t aware of any of their connections.”156 Despite what these critics 
point to as evidence of the failure of the MED’s security measures, the CIC Detachment 
had many remarkable successes. CIC agents investigated nearly 400,000 workers and 600 
companies and scrutinized nearly 100 cases of suspected espionage and 200 cases of 
sabotage.157 Although the detachment had a number of noteworthy failures (Klaus Fuchs, 
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David Greenglass, Theodore Hall, and George Koval),158 evidence of the Detachment’s 
successes is found in the dual facts that neither Germany nor Japan was aware of the 
progress of America’s nuclear weapons program and that many of the Manhattan 
Project’s own workers remained ignorant of the organization’s ultimate goal until after it 
was revealed on August 6, 1945, in the President’s official press release.159  
The CIC Detachment also had another important success, the ALSOS mission. 
Originally conceived by Lansdale, ALSOS was the code name of a unit established in the 
fall of 1943 and led by Counterintelligence officer Lieutenant Colonel Boris T. Pash.160 
The MED provided personnel and supervision for ALSOS, an organization comprising 
teams of combat troops, scientists, and CIC agents and designed to search Europe in 
order to locate and seize scientists, nuclear materials, and any evidence regarding enemy 
nuclear weapons programs.161 ALSOS teams deployed to Italy, France, Belgium, and 
Germany—sometimes behind enemy lines—and they succeeded in locating and seizing 
nearly 100 tons of uranium ore along with nuclear equipment, relevant documents, and 
many prominent German nuclear scientists.162 Additionally, after receiving information 
about a suspected German nuclear facility located within the Soviet occupation zone, 
General Groves coordinated with General Carl Spaatz, the commander of the Army’s 
Strategic Air Forces in Europe, to have the facility destroyed by aerial bombardment.163 
In his memoir, Groves mentioned, “there was a strong current of opinion in favor of  
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continuing” the ALSOS unit; however, the organization that had achieved so much 
success towards the end of the war in Europe was officially disbanded by mid-October 
1945.164 Nevertheless, ALSOS laid the foundation for modern counterproliferation 
programs. 
4. The Manhattan Project Atomic Bomb Investigating Group 
Two days after the Army Air Force dropped Fat Man on Nagasaki, Groves 
ordered his new deputy, Brigadier General Thomas F. Farrell, to form an investigating 
group to begin the process of collecting “scientific, technical and medical intelligence in 
the atomic bomb field from within Japan,” according to a Manhattan Engineer District 
report.165 The group, which was tasked to depart as soon as the fighting had ended, was 
split into three teams: one to investigate Hiroshima, another Nagasaki, and the third to 
search for information pertaining to Japan’s nuclear program.166 Within days of Groves’s 
order, technical personnel waiting in California with their equipment were deployed 
overseas, and word was quickly spread throughout the military’s highest levels of 
command that the mission was to take place.167  
Members of Farrell’s investigating teams began arriving in Japan in September 
1945, and the teams collected information for over two weeks in Nagasaki and four days 
in Hiroshima.168 Information obtained from subsequent studies was later combined with 
data acquired during the initial investigation to form a final report produced by the 
Manhattan Engineer District.169 The report provides a comparison of the two target cities, 
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structures and people, discusses the various hazards created by an atomic explosion, and 
offers some general conclusions, primarily, that no evidence of persistent harmful 
radioactivity was found.170  
This data still serves as a primary source of information about radiation effects, 
and the bomb damage assessments formed the basis of early theories of nuclear war by 
strategists, such as Bernard Brodie and Herman Kahn. In addition to investigating the 
effects of nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and generating the official report 
of its findings, the investigating group also discovered five uranium-enrichment 
cyclotrons, two in Tokyo, two in Osaka, and one in Kyoto.171 Unfortunately, the U.S. 
Army’s destruction of the cyclotrons, which took place as the result of a 
misunderstanding, deprived U.S. analysts of potentially valuable sources of information; 
nevertheless, the discovery of Japan’s nuclear facilities confirmed U.S. estimates that 
Japan’s nuclear program was too small to produce nuclear weapons.172 
D. THE VIEWS OF THE SENIOR ARMY OFFICERS 
In order to better understand the organization responsible for the construction and 
employment of the atomic bombs, it is important to examine the beliefs and attitudes of 
its leaders, the officers whose decisions not only shaped the Manhattan Project but also 
influenced the development of organizations, such as the U.S. Air Force, the Strategic Air 
Command, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
After all, an officer’s character and worldview influence his or her decisions. For 
instance, according to Vincent Jones, the Army’s initial response to proposals to explore 
the potential military applications of atomic energy “was not generally enthusiastic.”173 
He hypothesizes that the Army’s early negative attitude towards nuclear weapons could 
have been influenced by the fiscal constraints of the 1930s, a time when military dollars 
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were carefully spent on vital resources, and not invested in programs that might not yield 
results.174 Other influential Army leaders, such as Dwight Eisenhower expressed concern 
about the extreme effects that nuclear weapons use would have on cities, which would 
ultimately have to be rebuilt, as America had resolved to do in war-torn Japan.175 After 
World War II, he wrote, “With the evidence of the most destructive war yet waged by the 
people of the earth about me, I gained increased hope that this development of what 
appeared to be the ultimate in destruction would drive men, in self-preservation, to find a 
way of eliminating war.”176 
Perry Smith offers another reason that could explain why the U.S. Army was 
initially reluctant to pursue nuclear weapons. He points out that the military was the 
target of harsh criticism during the interwar period due to its affiliation with the defense 
industries—particularly the ammunition industry—and the role that both the military and 
armaments manufacturers were alleged to have had concerning U.S. participation in the 
First World War.177 “The military leadership, especially within the Army, felt that there 
was a direct relationship between this pre-World War II criticism and the inability of the 
military to obtain the funds necessary for a large force when the danger of war increased 
in the late 1930s,” writes Smith.178 It is possible that, in addition to worrying about 
budgetary constraints, Army leaders during the 1930s, not wishing to draw criticism from 
the public as their predecessors had following World War I, were hesitant to develop 
relationships with scientists looking to design new weapons, particularly at a time when 
war appeared imminent on both eastern and western horizons. Nevertheless, once given 
the assignment in June 1942, the Army quickly went to work and, in a little over three 
years, produced America’s first nuclear ordnance. 
Although the United States had, by the summer of 1945, gained overwhelming 
advantages over its Asian foe—dominance of the sea and air, an unrivaled industrial 
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capacity, and the most powerful military alliance in the history of mankind—the Japanese 
still possessed defensive capabilities, and some intelligence appraisals indicated that the 
isolation and continued conventional bombardment of Japan would not be sufficient to 
induce surrender.179 With an army of two million armed and equipped soldiers in Japan’s 
main islands, the Japanese had the ability to prolong the war and exact a terrible price on 
the would-be allied invaders.180 Official U.S. military estimates predicted that an 
invasion would result in tens of thousands of U.S. casualties within the first thirty days 
and that in four months of fighting the number could exceed 120,000.181 Furthermore, the 
loss of life would not be limited to the armed forces of the belligerent parties. By March 
1945, Japanese officials had taken steps to militarize their civilian population, and past 
operations had revealed that civilian casualties could be expected to be high.182 A 
prolonged struggle would have meant greater devastation to the Japanese homeland since 
allied ground forces would have had to fight for territory in and around villages, urban 
centers while naval, and air forces would have continued to strike Japan’s cities. An 
invasion of Japan’s main islands would have been extremely costly in terms of U.S. 
casualties and the cost of Japan’s reconstruction. Surveys of U.S. public opinion, taken 
soon after Japan’s surrender, reveal that most Americans supported the decision to drop 
the atomic bombs.183 
In regard to the use of the atomic bombs against Japan, what were the views of 
the Army’s senior officers? Revisionist scholar Gar Alperovitz believes that many U.S. 
military leaders did not feel that the atomic bombings were necessary.184 According to 
Alperovitz, after the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, General Henry “Hap” Arnold 
expressed the opinion that the atomic bombings were unnecessary and that Japan had 
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actually surrendered for other reasons.185 Alperovitz points out that General Carl A. 
Spaatz opposed the use of the atomic bombs, as well as the destruction of cities.186 Later, 
Spaatz claimed that the nuclear attacks were not necessary and that even without an 
invasion Japan “would have surrendered without the atomic bomb.”187 General Curtis 
LeMay was more specific about the reason for Japan’s surrender. He claimed that, within 
weeks, the United States would have ended the war “without the Russians entering and 
without the atomic bomb.”188 When asked to clarify, LeMay answered, “Yes, with the B-
29.”189 “We were doing the job with incendiaries,” he stated later in life, claiming, “all 
the atomic bomb did was, in all probability, save a few days.”190 General Douglas 
MacArthur also maintained that it was not necessary to use the bombs against Japan.191 
On the other hand, General George Marshall went on record after the war supporting 
Truman’s decision, although evidence suggests that, before the bombings, the Army 
Chief of Staff did not judge that they were necessary to end the war.192  
Following the war, General Dwight D. Eisenhower repeatedly said that he had 
opposed the use of the atomic bomb and said that he had told Secretary of War Henry 
Stimson about his reservations regarding the bomb.193 “I expressed the hope that we 
would never have to use such a thing against any enemy because I disliked seeing the 
United States take the lead in introducing into war something as horrible and destructive 
as this new weapon was described to be,” wrote Eisenhower in his autobiography, 
describing his discussion with Stimson about the atomic bombs.194 “Moreover, I 
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mistakenly had some faint hope that if we never used the weapon in war other nations 
might remain ignorant of the fact that the problem of nuclear fission had been solved.”195  
Many of these opinions, however, were offered only after the war, making it 
necessary to further examine historical evidence to understand how Army officers felt 
prior to Japan’s surrender, as people often view things differently in retrospect. Robert J. 
Maddox cautions against blindly accepting the opinions of leaders regarding use of the 
bombs given after the war; rather, he emphasizes the importance of understanding what 
the leaders were saying before the war’s end.196 His book reveals that Army Air Force 
Generals Arnold, Spaatz, LeMay, and Twining not only believed that the atomic bombs 
were useful, but, contrary to their later statements, they may have also regarded the 
atomic bombs as responsible for bringing about Japan’s surrender.197 Maddox argues that 
soon after the Hiroshima bombing, Arnold boasted about the spectacular headlines that 
the bombing story had received in the newspapers, and both Spaatz and LeMay were 
scolded by General George Marshall for telling news reporters that “an invasion will not 
be necessary” because of the atomic bomb, a weapon they and others believed would 
render conventional armies obsolete.198 He also points out that LeMay concurred with the 
request of Spaatz and Twining on August 9, 1945, to drop a third atomic bomb on Tokyo 
and that Arnold was aware of this request.199 Robert Norris points out that it was these 
very generals who defended the strategic bombings of cities.200 Even Alperovitz 
mentions that, at one point, LeMay admitted to believing that the decision to use the 
bombs was a correct one.201 “I am certain in my own mind that they significantly  
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shortened the war and, therefore, saved lives in the long run,” said LeMay.202 Not long 
after the war, LeMay became an outspoken advocate of nuclear bombs as head of the new 
Strategic Air Command.203 
The man responsible for building the bomb, General Leslie Groves, claimed to 
have had “no qualms of conscience about the making or using of it.”204 According to 
Robert Norris, Groves maintained this view for the remainder of his life.205 In his 1962 
memoir, Groves wrote that he had been extremely disappointed after learning of his 
assignment to the MED, since he was unimpressed with what he had heard about the size 
and the nature of the project; however, he concluded the memoir by saying that it had 
been absolutely necessary for the United States to develop the atomic bomb.206 It is 
important to note that Groves was not opposed to relinquishing control of the national 
nuclear program to civilians following the war.207 Speaking before the House Committee 
on Military Affairs on October 9, 1945, Groves said, “In coming before your committee 
today we are appealing for an opportunity to give you our existing powers.”208 It must be 
noted that, in all instances, Army leaders consistently deferred to civilian authority in 
matters of nuclear policy and strategy. In the end, President Truman was the one who 
decided to use the bombs against Japan, and, throughout the remainder of his life, he 
never expressed regret about his decision.209  
E. CONCLUSION 
After assuming responsibility for the atomic program, the U.S. Army played an 
integral role in developing and using the United States’ first nuclear weapons. The Army 
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Corps of Engineers acquired the land for the nuclear facilities, oversaw the construction 
and operation of the sites, and provided secret funding for the program. SED soldiers 
augmented the shorthanded scientific staffs at the project sites and conducted a range of 
scientific and technical work. When the MED faced manpower shortages, its leaders 
relied on soldiers from the Women’s Army Corps. While MPs guarded the MED 
facilities, CIC soldiers worked to safeguard the U.S. nuclear secrets, and Army 
logisticians kept the sites supplied. Army soldiers who were assigned to the ALSOS 
teams were also responsible for carrying out some of the nation’s first nuclear 
counterproliferation operations. In August 1945, after the first two operational bombs 
were completed, soldiers of the Army Air Force’s 509th Composite Group dropped them 
on Japanese cities. Later, Manhattan Project soldiers investigated the effects of the bombs 
and assembled their findings in an official report, and the Army continued to manage the 
U.S. peacetime atomic program successfully for over a year before turning it over to 
civilian authorities. Although the Army would never have been able to accomplish all of 
these tasks without the contributions of many civilians, it certainly played a significant 
role in developing, employing, and understanding the nation’s first nuclear weapons. 
Once the atomic bomb fell on Hiroshima, nuclear weapons became a mainstay in 
defense planning, foreign policy, domestic politics, and international relations. It is 
important, therefore, to assess the U.S. military’s attitude toward nuclear weapons 
because of the organization’s prominent role in warfighting. Furthermore, understanding 
the Army’s formative attitudes toward nuclear weapons sheds light on Cold War thinking 
about nuclear weapons and their effects on war and conflict in the modern age. Although 
the Army was initially hesitant to explore the possibilities of warfighting with nuclear 
weapons, it was quick to develop them once President Roosevelt placed the Army in 
charge of the nation’s nuclear program. Examining the roles and views of the senior 
Army officers who were participants in the world’s first nuclear war reveals that it took 
the efforts and support of many officers to develop and use nuclear weapons during 
World War II, despite the fact that many of those same leaders could not agree on the 
value of such use. 
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III. THE U.S. ARMY’S COLD WAR NUCLEAR ROLES 
The Army has no wish to scrap its previous experience in favor of 
unproven doctrine, or in order to accommodate enthusiastic theorists 
having little or no responsibility for the consequences of following the 
courses of action they advocate. While the Army is adapting itself readily 
to the employment of new weapons and new techniques, nothing currently 
available or foreseeable in war reduces the essentiality of mobile, 
powerful ground forces, the only forces which can seize the enemy’s land 
and the people living thereon, and exercise control of both thereafter. 
—Excerpt from a letter written to U.S. Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson  
by Army Chief of Staff Matthew Ridgway in 1955210 
During the early years of the Cold War, at a time when it appeared that nuclear 
weapons would soon relegate the armies of the world to nothing more than permanent 
civil defense forces,211 the United States Army was relieved of many of its nuclear roles 
and responsibilities. Yet, the Army’s contributions to America’s nuclear endeavors did 
not end with the establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission or the creation of the 
Department of the Air Force, although these events undoubtedly altered the nuclear roles 
of the U.S. Army. This chapter examines the Army during the Cold War to determine the 
extent of its nuclear efforts. After a brief description of the interservice rivalry that took 
place during the early years of the Cold War, this chapter will examine the Army’s 
tactical nuclear weapons, its contributions to the military’s nuclear education, and its 
involvement in nuclear training and testing. Following that, the chapter will survey Army 
nuclear doctrine and discuss the deployment of the Army’s nuclear weapons. Before 
concluding, the chapter will discuss the Army Nuclear Power Program and examine some 
of the views about nuclear weapons held by U.S. Army officers during the Cold War. 
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A. THE ARMY’S FIGHT FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
The President said the original mistake in this whole business was our 
failure to create one single Service in 1947. 
—Excerpt from “Memorandum of Conference with President Eisenhower, 
July 6, 1960”212 
During World War II and the immediate post-war years, U.S. advocates of air 
power redoubled their efforts to organize an independent military service of their own—
one that could win the nation’s wars in the air.213 Fighting for organizational 
independence, Army Air Force leaders made the case that air forces were superior to 
naval and ground forces, and some suggested that the surface navy had reached its final 
days.214 When the National Security Act of 1947 established the U.S. Air Force as a 
separate service, the Army lost aircraft, personnel, and its role as the nation’s champion 
of nuclear warfare. Soon thereafter, the Air Force, the Navy, and the Army began a 
heated debate about each service’s role in nuclear warfighting.215 While funding for the 
Army steadily declined in the years following World War II, Air Force expenditures 
continued to grow until the Air Force’s budget nearly equaled those of the Army and the 
Navy combined.216 According to Fred Kaplan, the Air Force, with its Strategic Air 
Command, came to dominate not just nuclear strategy and doctrine, but all national 
defense planning.217 “Because the atomic bomb seemed well-suited to strategic bombing 
applications,” explained John Midgley, “the newly-independent Air Force launched a 
series of attempts to gain primary responsibility for development and delivery of the 
weapons in the late 1940s.”218 The interservice rivalry spawned by the advent of nuclear 
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weapons and the creation of the U.S. Air Force has received considerable attention in 
academic and professional literature over the years.219 
Amidst the interservice struggles for relevance during the early years of the 
nuclear weapons age, the Army fought to gain access to the very weapons that it had 
played such an important role in creating. Beginning in January 1946, top Army leaders 
made the case that the Army should be permitted to develop an arsenal of its own.220 
Army Chief of Staff Dwight Eisenhower sought to convince the Joint Chiefs to allow his 
service to explore the tactical applications of nuclear weapons and develop “the best kind 
of Army to build around the all-powerful atomic weapons.”221 The Army’s quest for 
nuclear weapons was also taken up by Eisenhower’s successors as Chief of Staff. In 
1948, General Omar Bradley presented a similar argument to the other service chiefs in 
response to an attempt by Air Force General Carl Spaatz to wrest control of the joint 
Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP) from the other services, and General J. 
Lawton Collins advocated for the Army again two years later in order to prevent it from 
being edged out of the nation’s strategic defense planning altogether.222  
By 1950, the Army had received orders to procure its own nuclear weapons after 
President Truman’s loss of faith in the prospects for international control of nuclear 
weapons following the Soviet Union’s rejection of the U.S.-proposed Baruch Plan for 
international control of atomic energy, the Soviet support for a Communist coup in 
Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet blockade of West Berlin. “I am of the opinion we’ll never 
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obtain international control,” President Truman told his advisors in July 1949, adding, 
“since we can’t obtain international control we must be strongest in atomic weapons.”223 
This belief was reflected in NSC-68, presented in April 1950.224 In addition to approving 
weapons increases in 1949, 1950, and 1952, Truman authorized the development of 
tactical nuclear weapons and thermonuclear weapons, thus broadening the spectrum of 
U.S. nuclear capabilities.225  
Although the Army was able to acquire a relatively small arsenal of tactical 
nuclear weapons from the AEC during the Korean War,226 the election of President 
Eisenhower changed the trajectory of U.S. national security strategy and placed the Army 
firmly on the path to becoming a full-fledged nuclear service. The 1952 presidential 
election, even more than the establishment of the Department of the Air Force, provided 
the impetus for the Army to transform itself from a largely conventional force into a 
nuclear one. Prior to Eisenhower’s ascension to the presidency, Army leaders—including 
Eisenhower—had fought to prevent the Air Force’s gaining a monopoly on nuclear 
weapons planning and delivery. After the 1952 election, the Army fought for relevance in 
the nation’s defense enterprise. In other words, it fought for organizational survival. This 
struggle, in many ways, influenced the course of the Army’s evolution during the Cold 
War. 
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The Eisenhower administration believed that defense policies of the previous 
administration had been dangerously ambitious.227 Soon after taking office, Eisenhower 
drafted a letter to a friend, explaining his concerns about the nation’s defense spending: 
We are trying to bring the total expenditures of the American Government 
within reasonable limits. This is not because of any belief that we can 
afford relaxation of the combined effort to combat Soviet communism. On 
the contrary, it grows out of a belief that our organized, effective 
resistance must be maintained over a long period of years and that this is 
possible only with a healthy American economy. If we should proceed 
recklessly and habitually to create budget deficits year after year, we have 
with us an inflationary influence that can scarcely be successfully 
combatted. Our particular form of economy could not endure.228 
It was because of the administration’s desire for economic prosperity, as well as its faith 
in nuclear deterrence that it charted a new strategic course and called it the New Look, 
which placed strategic airpower at the tip of the nation’s defense spear.229 “The result of 
the Eisenhower review was the emergence of a deeper dependence on nuclear weapons 
and long-range airpower to deter war,” wrote Herman Wolk, an Air Force historian.230 
According to Wolk, instead of maintaining the forces that had borne the brunt of the 
fighting on the Korean peninsula, Eisenhower chose “to invest more heavily in airpower, 
especially [the] Strategic Air Command, in large part because that kind of defense could 
be built for lower cost.”231 
Eisenhower’s national security strategy, outlined in NSC 162/2 in October 1953, 
explained how the administration intended to provide adequate security for an affordable 
cost. The document pointed out that the emphasis of the nation’s defense posture would 
be placed “on the capability of inflicting massive retaliatory damage by offensive striking 
power” while the United States maintained “a sound, strong and growing economy” that 
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could endure “over the long pull.”232 On January 12, 1954, Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles gave a speech in New York explaining the new strategy.233 Dulles said, “The way 
to deter aggression is for the free community to be willing and able to respond vigorously 
at places and with means of its own choosing.”234 Under the Eisenhower administration, 
Dulles declared, the United States would “depend primarily upon a great capacity to 
retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our own choosing.”235 He continued, “It is 
now possible to get, and share, more basic security at less cost.”236  
Many Army and Navy leaders disagreed with President Eisenhower’s defense 
policies.237 Some thought that the strategy of massive retaliation was not sufficient to 
deter communist aggression. General Maxwell Taylor wrote, “The ink was hardly dry on 
the New Look before the episode of the fall of Dien Bien Phu provided a practical test of 
the efficacy of the New Look strategy and exposed its weakness.”238 The New Look also 
meant that the Army would have even less resources—manpower and funding—to 
defend the nation and its allies from a growing communist threat. By the mid-1950s, 
Communist regimes had taken over in Russia, Eastern Europe, China, North Vietnam, 
and North Korea in what seemed to be an existential battle between communism and 
capitalism.239 Even Eisenhower recognized the position in which his policies placed the 
Army and its leaders. “Their role,” said President Eisenhower in 1956, “is rather hazy to 
many of them.”240 Nevertheless, the Army quickly found ways to use tactical nuclear 
weapons as tools to deter the nation’s enemies and defend America and its allies with 
fewer soldiers and less funding. For the remainder of the Cold War, the Army continued 
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to develop nuclear weapons and prepare for what some at the time believed was a likely 
threat to the security of the free world; nuclear war with a global communist front 
determined to eradicate capitalism and to conquer the free world under the banner of 
Communism. 
B. TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS: THE ARMY’S SECOND NUCLEAR 
ARSENAL 
This discovery of American scientists can be man’s greatest benefit. And it 
can destroy him. It is against the latter terrible possibility that this nation 
must prepare or perish. Atomic power will affect the peaceful life of every 
individual on earth. And it will at the same time affect every instrument 
and technique of destruction. But the atomic bomb is not alone among the 
scientific advances that make the possibilities of the future so terrifying. 
The development of aircraft and rockets and electronics has become 
equally incredible. 
—General George C. Marshall241 
After the establishment of the Air Force as a separate service removed from the 
Army its mission of delivering nuclear weapons—which until the early 1950s consisted 
only of air-deliverable gravity bombs—the U.S. Army began to acquire ground-based 
nuclear delivery systems.242 The development of the Army’s second nuclear arsenal 
gained momentum in 1950–1951, at the beginning of the Korean War, when the Army 
received substantial increases in its weapons research and development budget.243 By 
1952, the United States began producing its first tactical nuclear warheads, the MK-9 
Artillery Fired Atomic Projectiles (AFAPs).244 From that point until 1991, the U.S. Army 
once again had a role in the delivery of nuclear weapons. 
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1. Nuclear Artillery 
The U.S. Army’s first tactical nuclear weapon system was the M65, a 280mm 
cannon capable of firing the MK-9 AFAP to a distance of nearly 14 miles.245 Originally 
conceived by the Army in 1949, the M65 was tested in May 1953 during Operation 
UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE in Nevada, where the MK-9 produced a 15-kiloton explosion.246 
Although M65 cannons were eventually deployed to Germany and South Korea, they 
were all withdrawn by 1962, and both types of ordnance developed for the cannons, the 
MK-9 and the MK-19 AFAP, were retired from service by 1963.247 Although the M65 
provided commanders with an organic nuclear delivery system, the 280mm cannon was 
too cumbersome for the rapid movement that was thought necessary for successful 
employment in a nuclear war.248 As a result, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) 
developed nuclear artillery rounds for the military’s more maneuverable 155mm and 
203mm howitzer artillery pieces, both of which were deployed overseas and maintained 
throughout the Cold War.249 
2. Nuclear Missiles and Rockets 
“If you are planning the Grand Strategy for tomorrow’s war, you must consider 
seriously the impact of guided missiles,” wrote Major General J. L. Homer, the 
commander of the U.S. Army’s Antiaircraft Artillery and Guided Missile Center, in 
November 1947.250 “It is now apparent that this weapon may be developed to strike any 
portion of the globe from any geographical position.”251 General Homer penned these 
words a full decade before the Soviets in October 1957 launched Sputnik I, the world’s 
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first manmade satellite, into orbit and confirmed that the Soviet Union would soon 
possess the capacity to attack the United States or its allies with nuclear weapons 
delivered by intercontinental ballistic missiles. Although Homer recognized shortcomings 
in missile technology in the late 1940s, he said that these were “purely mechanical 
limitations that research and development may overcome in the future.”252 Homer was 
not the first Army officer to consider the implications of advances in missile technology. 
Just months after Japan’s surrender in 1945, Lieutenant Colonel Irving J. Harrell, Jr., an 
instructor in the Ordnance Department of the Command and General Staff School, 
published an article stating, “Only time will tell what the future holds for rockets, but 
future wars will probably see the use of bigger and more efficient rockets in ever-
increasing numbers.”253 
In 1953, only a year after the United States began production of the MK-9, the 
Army acquired its first nuclear missile, the Corporal, which was capable of delivering its 
W-7 warhead to a target 75 miles away.254 As America’s first operational guided missile, 
the Corporal represented a breakthrough in U.S. military technology.255 However, like 
the M65, the Corporal also had its shortcomings; it was liquid-fueled and very large, 
making it difficult to set up for a timely launch.256 Nevertheless, the Corporal provided 
the Army with an organic nuclear delivery system with greater range than the M65, and it 
served as a short-term solution until more advanced systems could be developed.257 The 
following year, the Army’s Honest John rocket entered into the Initial Operational 
Capability (IOC) phase.258 Although the Honest John was a heavy, unguided rocket with 
a range of just over twenty miles, it was solid-fueled and capable of being fired relatively 
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quickly from a truck.259 Soon thereafter, the Army also developed the solid-fueled, air-
transportable Little John, which gave ground forces a nuclear delivery system with much 
greater maneuverability; however, the Little John was limited to a range of only 10 
miles.260  
As the Little John was being developed, the Army began fielding the Redstone 
missile while simultaneously working to develop the Jupiter missile, both of which had 
much longer ranges than the Corporal.261 During the mid-1950s, the Jupiter program was 
the most successful missile program in America. On September 20, 1956, a Jupiter 
missile achieved a flight distance of 3,300 miles, and it could have placed a satellite into 
orbit if the Army had been given permission to do so at the time.262 If the U.S. Army had 
orbited a satellite on that date, the United States would have been the first country to 
place a satellite into space, a full year before the Soviets succeeded with the orbit of 
Sputnik I. In light of the political pressure arising from Sputnik I and Sputnik II, as well as 
problems with the Navy’s rocket program, the Army Ballistic Missile Agency was 
ordered to place a satellite into orbit by March 1958.263 Less than three months after the 
order was given, the Army accomplished its mission by using a modified Jupiter-C 
missile to launch Explorer I, America’s first satellite, into orbit on January 31, 1958, a 
month ahead of schedule and seven months prior to the establishment of the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).264 The Army continued to serve the 
nation’s interests in space by placing additional satellites into orbit until it was obliged to 
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hand over its space program to the newly established NASA in 1960.265 Throughout the 
Cold War, the Army continued its development of rockets and missiles capable of 
carrying nuclear warhead payloads. In addition to those already mentioned, the Army 
developed the Sergeant surface-to-surface rocket; the Lacrosse, Lance, Pershing I, and 
Pershing II surface-to-surface missiles; and the Nike Hercules, Spartan, and Sprint 
surface-to-air missiles.266 
3. Other Nuclear Devices 
During the Cold War, the United States also developed a variety of Atomic 
Demolition Munitions (ADMs) and Davy Crockett recoilless rifles. ADMs first entered 
the Army’s nuclear arsenal in 1954,267 and one of the first tests of an ADM occurred in 
1955 during Operation TEAPOT in Nevada.268 Intended to be used as engineering tools 
to deny an enemy access to specific areas or avenues of approach or to destroy enemy 
fortifications, ADMs were designed for use by small teams of engineers or special 
operations forces.269 The smallest ADM,270 known as the Special Atomic Demolition 
Munition (SADM), weighed approximately 150 pounds and used the 59-pound W-54 
warhead. This warhead’s two-man emplacement team could select from a range of 
explosive yields progressing from tens of tons to a thousand tons equivalent of TNT.271 
Once put into position, ADMs could be detonated by either a timer or a remote device.272 
Eventually, Army leaders grew skeptical about the practicality of employing ADMs in a 
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conflict and about the utility of being prepared to do so. In 1987, after considering how 
quickly U.S. forces would need to use ADMs near the demilitarized zone (DMZ) in 
Korea to prevent them from falling into enemy hands in the event of a North Korean 
invasion, General Louis Menetrey, the U.S. commander there, said that keeping ADMs 
near the DMZ was “pretty dumb.”273 A similar recognition occurred in Europe, where 
Army planners came to realize that, in the event of an attack by the Warsaw Pact, ADMs 
would need to be employed in Allied territory at the beginning of a conflict if they were 
to be used at all.274 Major General William F. Burns (Ret.) noted, “As this realization 
sank in, such weapons were quietly retired.”275 
In 1961, the United States also began to produce recoilless rifles capable of firing 
a sub-kiloton nuclear warhead to a distance of over a mile for the 120mm version of the 
recoilless rifle and nearly two and a half miles for the 155mm version.276 The Davy 
Crockett, as the weapon system was named, was first tested in 1962 during Operation 
DOMINIC II in Nevada.277 After being launched from an armored personnel carrier, the 
warhead successfully traveled to its target nearly two miles away and produced a 20-ton 
yield explosion.278 By 1965, nearly 400 warheads had been produced for the Davy 
Crockett system.279 As with ADMs, Davy Crockett weapons were deployed to countries 
throughout the world.280 By 1971, however, the Davy Crockett was completely removed 
from the U.S. nuclear arsenal.281 According to John Midgley, the removal of Davy 
Crockett recoilless rifles from the Army’s inventory came after commanders serving in 
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Europe had criticized the weapon system, and after practice firings of the Davy Crockett 
had revealed that the weapons were inaccurate.282 
C. NUCLEAR EDUCATION 
Shortly after the turnover to the Atomic Energy Commission, I was 
designated to organize the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project 
(AFSWP). This job had its genesis in a conversation I had had with 
Secretary Patterson following the passage of the Atomic Energy Act…. He 
said then that he was concerned about how the War Department would be 
able to fulfill its responsibilities resulting from the development of atomic 
weapons, and urged me to remain on active duty to handle the problems 
this would present. 
—Lieutenant General (Ret.) Leslie R. Groves283 
Although the Manhattan Project was terminated on December 31, 1946, the U.S. 
Army’s Manhattan Engineer District (MED) lasted until August 1947.284 It was during 
the MED’s final months that Major General Groves organized and commanded the 
Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP), a joint organization created by the 
civilian leaders of the Army and the Navy.285 The AFSWP was responsible for the 
development of nuclear technologies for use by the nation’s armed forces.286 In April 
1947, Groves completed the AFSWP’s draft charter and presented it to service chiefs 
Dwight Eisenhower and Chester Nimitz; three months later, a revised version of Groves’s 
charter was approved.287 “The charter was not everything Groves had hoped for, but at 
least it gave him a toehold on the operational, as well as the policy side of the atomic 
weapon effort,” wrote historians Richard Hewlett and Francis Duncan.288 “In the special 
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weapons project he [Groves] could make sure the military services would have the 
nuclear weapons they needed in time of crisis.”289 
Groves also established the AFSWP’s Nuclear Weapons Technical Training 
Group at Sandia Base near Albuquerque, New Mexico.290 The mission of the Nuclear 
Weapons Technical Training Group was “to provide training, both resident and non-
resident, in support of nuclear weapon training programs worldwide; to be responsive to 
requests for training services and support required to meet the needs of all DOD 
components and other cognizant agencies.”291 At Sandia Base, officers and 
noncommissioned officers were trained on the assembly of nuclear bombs.292 
“Throughout, the aim was to give each man as much technical information as he could 
absorb,” remembered Groves.293 “The whole purpose of the operation was to make 
absolutely certain that in case of war, or even the threat of war, the Defense Department 
would have at its instant disposal teams ready and trained to assemble atomic 
weapons.”294  
After Groves’s retirement from the Army, President Truman appointed Major 
General Kenneth Nichols, the former deputy commander of the Manhattan Project, as the 
head of the AFSWP on March 11, 1948.295 Later that month, General Eisenhower 
ordered Nichols to expedite the training of military personnel on the assembly of nuclear 
weapons in order to ensure that the military was prepared to respond to potential 
crises.296 At the time, only civilian engineers were capable of assembling the nation’s 
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nuclear weapons.297 By 1953, over 7,000 service members were involved in nuclear 
weapons training provided by the AFSWP.298 The Nuclear Weapons Technical Training 
Group, which had been established by the Manhattan Engineer District under Groves’s 
command, later became the Special Weapons School, the predecessor of the Interservice 
Nuclear Weapons School and, eventually, the Defense Nuclear Weapons School, which 
still exists today.299 Likewise, key elements of the Defense Nuclear Agency and the 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency can be traced back to the AFSWP, which was 
chartered and organized by the Army’s Manhattan Engineer District.300 
D. NUCLEAR TRAINING 
In addition to playing an important role in the establishment of the Nuclear 
Weapons Technical Training Group, designed to train personnel from each of the military 
services, the U.S. Army took additional steps to ensure that its soldiers were prepared to 
fight in a nuclear war. In the 1950s, the U.S. Army’s Field Artillery School began 
training soldiers on the use of nuclear field artillery and missiles.301 By 1965, the U.S. 
Army’s Ordnance Guided Missile School (OGMS) at Redstone Arsenal in Alabama had 
assumed responsibility for managing the Army’s nuclear weapons instruction, although 
the actual training was not conducted at Redstone at that time.302 During the 1970s, 
however, the Ordnance Missile and Munitions Center and School (OMMCS), OGMS’s 
successor, began conducting nuclear weapons training at Redstone Arsenal.303 The Army 
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has also conducted nuclear weapons training at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland; 
Fort Belvoir, Virginia; and Indian Head, Maryland.304 
The Army also participated in large-scale training exercises to evaluate the 
preparedness of its units and determine the best methods for arraying its forces and 
conducting operations on a nuclear battlefield. Training for nuclear war was first 
attempted in 1951 during a joint training event called Exercise SOUTHERN PINE.305 
The following year, the Army conducted training that included nuclear scenarios during 
Exercise SNOW FALL.306 Throughout 1955, the Army executed training exercises 
FOLLOW ME, BLUE BOLT, and SAGE BRUSH, during which opposing forces 
exchanged simulated nuclear strikes.307 During Exercise SAGE BRUSH, the largest 
training exercise to have taken place inside the continental United States since World 
War II, nearly 110,000 Army soldiers and 30,000 members of the Air Force participated 
in a battle involving simulated attacks with chemical, biological, and electronic weapons 
as well as over nineteen megatons-worth of notional nuclear ordnance.308 
E. NUCLEAR TESTING 
In addition to participating in joint training exercises to improve the military’s 
readiness to fight in a nuclear war, the U.S. Army also took part in the nation’s first 
peacetime nuclear weapons tests, from which the U.S. government gained valuable data 
concerning nuclear weapons designs and effects. Originally conceived in the summer of 
1945, Operation CROSSROADS was a series of two atomic tests at Bikini Atoll in the 
Marshall Islands in 1946 intended to test the effects of nuclear explosions on naval 
vessels and other military equipment and to determine the most effective way to use 
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atomic weapons against naval formations.309 In addition to being the first peacetime 
nuclear explosion, Operation CROSSROADS was also, at that point in history, the 
nation’s largest peacetime military operation ever performed.310 Included in the 42,000 
personnel involved in the operation were nearly 3,300 U.S. Army soldiers, who were 
tasked with dropping the first bomb in the test series; collecting air samples; determining 
weather conditions; providing logistical and signal support; and measuring radiation, 
equipment damage, and effective range for each of the nuclear explosions.311 During this 
$1.3 billion operation, the Army entered into the health physics and biology field of 
nuclear weapons when select Army personnel were provided with film badges to monitor 
their exposure to nuclear radiation.312 
In the spring of 1948, the newly-established Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) 
conducted its first series of nuclear tests during Operation SANDSTONE at the Pacific 
Proving Ground (PPG) in the Marshall Islands.313 Although the AEC was responsible for 
the operation, an Army general officer led the task force that conducted the operation, 
Joint Task Force 7, and the Chief of Staff of the Army was the military’s executive agent 
for the test series.314 Over 1,300 Army personnel were involved in Operation 
SANDSTONE, providing logistical and signal support; managing the task force; 
constructing test structures, airstrips, and base facilities; and assisting with the 
experimental scientific aspects of the operation.315 Once again, Army personnel were 
given film badges to determine their radiation exposure.316 A 1948 report by the AEC 
noted that “the measurements made during the [SANDSTONE] tests…furnished a much 
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sounder basis for the understanding of atomic explosions, which is necessary for the 
further development of atomic weapons.”317 
The U.S. Army continued to participate in nuclear weapons tests during the 
1950s. Army officers were involved in experiments during all five of the nuclear tests 
constituting Operation RANGER in the early months of 1951.318 Nearly 1,400 Army 
personnel worked to construct base facilities prior to Operation GREENHOUSE in the 
spring of the same year, and the Army provided logistical support throughout the 
operation.319 During the summer of 1951, the Army sought authorization from the AEC 
to conduct training and psychological experiments in conjunction with nuclear tests.320 
Although the AEC would not allow soldiers to come within seven miles of a nuclear 
explosion unless they were entrenched underground, the Army was given permission to 
establish a camp (codenamed Desert Rock) to observe nuclear explosions and to conduct 
psychological experiments on soldiers.321 During Operation BUSTER-JANGLE, the U.S. 
Army conducted “the first in a series of ‘atomic exercises,’” according to a 1995 report 
by the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments.322 Psychologists studied 
600 Army personnel during BUSTER-JANGLE,323 and military personnel were sent to 
within 500 yards of nuclear explosion sites only hours after the tests were conducted.324  
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For the next series of nuclear tests, named Operation TUMBLER-SNAPPER, the 
military requested permission from the AEC to place troops much closer to the nuclear 
explosions than it had in previous tests.325 The AFSWP proposed positioning troops in 
trenches located just 7,000 yards from the explosions and maneuvering ground forces 
near the point of detonation following each test.326 After some consideration, the AEC 
approved the AFSWP’s request.327 During TUMBLER-SNAPPER, the Army continued 
its psychological experiments,328 and troops positioned 7,000 yards from ground zero left 
their foxholes to conduct maneuvers near the points of detonation after the explosions.329 
The AEC reported that the TUMBLER-SNAPPER tests were “a fundamental part of the 
weapons development process and…essential to advancement in this phase of work, both 
to improve weapon design and performance, and to increase knowledge of the effects of 
atomic explosions.”330 
On November 1, 1952, Joint Task Force 132, designated by President Truman and 
led by an Army officer, tested the world’s first nuclear fusion device during Operation 
IVY.331 Over 1,300 Army personnel were involved in the operation.332 They provided 
logistical and signal support, conducted experiments, and performed radiological safety 
functions.333 In addition to testing a fusion explosion during Operation IVY, the task 
force also tested a boosted fission bomb.334 These tests marked an important milestone in 
the development of more powerful nuclear weapons designs.  
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During America’s next series of nuclear tests, named Operation UPSHOT-
KNOTHOLE, the AEC permitted the military to position troops even closer than it had 
during TUMBLER-SNAPPER.335 Instead of the previous 7,000 yard limit, many troops 
were allowed to be entrenched only 3,500 yards away from the nuclear explosions, and 
several dozen Army officers volunteered to be placed in foxholes only 1,500 yards from 
the blasts.336 In addition to testing the effects of nuclear explosions on entrenched 
soldiers during UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE, the Army conducted its third series of 
psychological experiments, tested its first nuclear artillery round from a 280mm cannon, 
and participated in large training exercises involving over 13,000 soldiers near ground 
zero following six of the nuclear explosions in the series.337 Many of these soldiers were 
exposed to radioactive fallout, and some required immediate evacuation.338 Despite the 
possibility of exposing greater numbers of soldiers to dangerous fallout, the Army 
decided to continue placing officer volunteers in close proximity to nuclear explosions 
during Operations TEAPOT in 1955 and PLUMBBOB in 1957; however, the AFSWP 
denied the Army’s request to continue decreasing the distance between soldiers and 
nuclear explosions.339  
F. NUCLEAR DOCTRINE 
It is incumbent upon us all to assist in developing tactics and organization 
which will make the best use of the capabilities of the tactical atomic 
weapon. If we believe the advent of nuclear weapons presents an 
insurmountable problem to the strategist, tactician, and logistician, we 
have begun to lose the flexibility and imagination without which we are 
doomed to defeat. If we accept this technological advancement as the 
greatest challenge in centuries of military operations, we can make this 
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force the basis for the preservation of peace—or for victory in war if the 
need arises. 
—Brigadier General William F. Train, U.S. Army Assistant Commandant, 
Command and General Staff College340 
In John Midgley’s view, the Army was unable to develop “realistic doctrine” for 
the nuclear battlefield.341 He wrote that “doctrinal development became a process of 
grafting atomic weapons onto the conventional army”342 and that the Army failed to 
define properly the “tactical requirements”343 and the “military characteristics of the 
nuclear battlefield,”344 to understand “the effects of atomic weapons,”345 or to determine 
whether the Army could “actually conduct a nuclear campaign.”346 According to 
Midgley, “doctrine was written to demonstrate that the Army could…conduct the types 
of operations it claimed were necessary while using atomic weapons.”347 In his opinion, 
“it was the prevention of an Air Force atomic monopoly, rather than a quest for some 
specific battlefield capability,”348 that drove this process. Although evidence suggests 
that the Army’s initial efforts to gain access to nuclear weapons were in part the result of 
inter-service struggles, Midgley’s argument does not explain the Army’s doctrinal and 
organizational evolution throughout the 1950s and 1960s. In fact, for years after the 
initial competition for nuclear missions occurred, Army officers and planners wrestled 
with the hard realities of the nuclear battlefield. Far removed from high politics over 
strategic doctrine, the Army had no choice but to figure out how to make sense of the 
extraordinary explosive power available through nuclear weapons. 
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The Army did not overlook the characteristics of the nuclear battlefield, nor did it 
fail to grasp the implications of nuclear weapons; rather, it developed its doctrine based 
upon notions of what the battlefield would look like given the destructive power of 
nuclear weapons. “The Army recognized that a dynamic change had occurred in the 
military environment with the advent of atomic technology,”349 wrote John P. Rose. In 
his book published in 1980, Rose pointed out that “U.S. Army officers in the 1950s were 
greatly concerned with the application of atomic firepower”350 and that they questioned 
not only the changing operational environment but also the composition and role of army 
units and the nature of joint operations in a nuclear war.351  
Andrew J. Bacevich also concluded that Army officers were quick to grasp the 
implications of nuclear weapons.352 “As never before, the Army focused on a simple 
factor—technology—as the principal determinant of how wars would be fought,” he 
said.353 For example, in 1950 Lieutenant General Leslie Groves was quoted as saying, “I 
anticipate the use of widely dispersed small forces—combat team size and even 
smaller—their equipment light—their supplies limited—not only air-supported but 
probably air-transported and air-supplied.”354 General Maxwell Taylor told students at 
the Command and General Staff College, “The Army is burning its military textbooks to 
clear away the old and make way for the new.”355 Even Midgley acknowledged, “the 
tentative steps toward incorporation of atomic weapons which had characterized the 
1945–52 period were replaced by bold strides including…new combat doctrine and a 
fundamental revision of the Army nuclear strategy” and that Army planners “devoted 
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their principal efforts to building units capable of exploiting the effects of battlefield 
nuclear weapons.”356  
Military doctrine is defined as the “fundamental principles that guide the 
employment of forces.”357 By 1954, the U.S. Army had incorporated principles regarding 
nuclear weapons as well as lessons learned from the Korean War into its Field Manual 
100-5 (FM 100-5).358 This manual prescribed the “integration of atomic firepower”359 
with maneuver, and it instructed commanders to “be prepared to rapidly exploit the 
advantages gained” if the decision was made to use nuclear weapons.360 In addition to 
describing how to plan for nuclear weapons use, the manual also articulated how 
commanders should employ their forces in a nuclear attack.361 “Plans provide for 
immediate movement through or around the target area. Exploiting units remain 
dispersed until the critical moment, then concentrate rapidly, and move to the decisive 
point to take maximum advantage of surprise and the enemy’s disorganization.”362 FM 
100-5 also discussed the employment of nuclear weapons in defensive operations.363 In 
conjunction with the development of written doctrine, the Army also participated in a 
number of large-scale nuclear training exercises, as discussed above, and increased the 
volume of institutional training focused on nuclear warfare.364  
Midgley’s claim that the development of doctrine “became a process of grafting 
atomic weapons onto the conventional army”365 overlooks the fact that the Army 
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drastically restructured its forces—twice—in response to nuclear-related changes in 
national strategy.366 The Army’s Pentomic divisions—restructured Army divisions 
consisting of five (penta) battle groups armed with nuclear (atomic) weapons and 
designed primarily for nuclear combat but intended to operate effectively on both the 
nuclear and nonnuclear battlefield—were developed to correspond to President 
Eisenhower’s New Look and its emphasis on nuclear deterrence and smaller conventional 
forces.367 Likewise, following President Kennedy’s directive to reform the Army into an 
organization better suited for nonnuclear conflicts,368 the Army responded by developing 
the Reorganization Objectives Army Division (ROAD).369 ROADs typically consisted of 
three brigades armed with both nuclear and conventional weapons, and they were capable 
of being tailored to meet operational demands.370 Like the Pentomic divisions, ROADs 
were intended to be dual-capable, but they were designed specifically for nonnuclear 
warfare.371 Furthermore, the Army published its 1954 doctrine guiding nuclear 
operations (FM 100-5) after the Army had already participated in a number of nuclear 
weapons effects tests, as described above, and also after it had begun to acquire nuclear 
weapons.372 Thus, the development of doctrine was not carried out without considering 
the effects of nuclear weapons, nor was it undertaken merely to justify the procurement 
of nuclear weapons or other equipment. The Army developed its nuclear doctrine to 
guide the employment of its forces in nuclear operations, and it was responsive to the 
changing demands of both national security and national strategy. 
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G. NUCLEAR DEPLOYMENTS 
Due to the significant threat facing U.S. allies in Europe and the Asia-Pacific 
region, the growing U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons during the Cold War, and the 
limited range of America’s early nuclear delivery systems, the United States thought it 
necessary to deploy nuclear weapons and their components overseas in order to deter 
communist aggression, assure U.S. allies regarding the genuineness of U.S. security 
commitments, and defend U.S. allies against possible attacks.373 Even before the Army 
acquired its second nuclear arsenal, the United States had already begun the overseas 
deployment of nonnuclear components of nuclear weapons.374 Not long after the Army 
received its first generation of tactical nuclear weapons—the 280mm atomic cannon, the 
Corporal missile, and the Honest John rocket375—it reportedly began to deploy them to 
countries throughout Europe as well as to South Korea and Japan.376  
1. Europe 
On April 4, 1949, the United States, Canada, and ten Western European countries 
established NATO in an effort to improve collective defense and regional stability.377 
This peacetime military alliance was the first that the United States had ever entered into 
outside of the Western Hemisphere, and it marked a significant break from a U.S. 
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tradition of isolation dating back to George Washington’s presidency.378 Article 5 of the 
North Atlantic Treaty commits members to act “to restore and maintain the security of 
the North Atlantic area” in the event of an attack and states that “an armed attack against 
one…shall be considered an attack against them all.”379 Since that time, nuclear weapons 
have played an important role in the alliance. Some European countries relied on the 
growing U.S. nuclear arsenal to deter Soviet aggression even before NATO was 
established.380 “It is certain that Europe would have been Communized, like 
Czechoslovakia, and London under bombardment some time ago but for the deterrent of 
the atomic bomb in the hands of the United States,” remarked Winston Churchill just 
days before the North Atlantic Treaty was signed.381 Moreover, many of the Europeans 
in favor of the alliance sought accession to the North Atlantic Treaty specifically for the 
purpose of obtaining from the United States a guarantee to use its nuclear weapons to 
defend Europe.382 Soon after NATO was formed, the United States formally committed 
its nuclear arsenal to the defense of the alliance.383 Thereafter, the United States used its 
nuclear arsenal to deter all forms of aggression against—and coercion of—its European 
allies throughout the Cold War, and it has continued to do so since.384  
From the early years of the Cold War, the United States has also maintained an 
on-shore arsenal of nuclear weapons in Europe. In 1950, President Harry Truman 
authorized the deployment of 89 sets of non-nuclear components of nuclear weapons to 
Great Britain.385 According to Norris, Arkin, and Burr, between 1954 and 1963, the 
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United States deployed a variety of nuclear weapons to eight European NATO countries: 
Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and West 
Germany.386 Whether U.S. nuclear weapons have ever been deployed in France remains 
open to debate. The topic remains highly sensitive. French scholars have been unable to 
reach conclusive findings.387 Germany alone has hosted as many as 21 different types of 
U.S. nuclear weapons since the mid-1950s.388 Furthermore, according to research based 
on a declassified but heavily redacted report drafted and released by the U.S. Department 
of Defense, it is clear that nuclear weapons were deployed to a number of other countries, 
although it is not publically known which countries those were.389 Nevertheless, most of 
the Army’s nuclear weapons systems—artillery pieces, missiles, rockets, recoilless rifles, 
and ADMs—were deployed to Europe.390  
In October 1957, the Soviet Union successfully launched its Sputnik I satellite 
into orbit. As a result of this event, the United States began to enter into nuclear sharing 
arrangements, which came to be known as Programs of Cooperation (POCs), with select 
allies in an effort to give them a more prominent role in nuclear deterrence as well as 
their own defense.391 POCs were bilateral agreements whereby either the United States 
would provide nuclear delivery systems, support, and training on those systems or allies 
would agree to allow the United States to base nuclear weapons and their components in 
their country or provide personnel and systems to deliver U.S. nuclear weapons.392 Under 
the arrangements, the United States military would maintain custody of the nuclear 
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weapons until authorized by the President to transfer them to U.S. allies in the event of 
war.393  
David Yost provides a number of reasons why the United States decided to enter 
into such arrangements, to reassure its allies of its defense commitments,394 to share with 
others the political burdens that come with incorporating nuclear weapons into a defense 
posture,395 and to enhance deterrence and “transatlantic cohesion.”396 By providing 
nuclear weapons to its allies, the United States also removed one of the incentives for 
nuclear proliferation.397 Since the POCs began, the United States has continued to share 
its nuclear responsibilities with some of its NATO allies. The NATO Allies affirmed the 
value of these arrangements in their 2012 Deterrence and Defense Posture Review, which 
states that NATO is committed to remaining “a nuclear alliance for as long as nuclear 
weapons exist” and that the North Atlantic Council (NAC) “will task the appropriate 
committees to develop concepts for how to ensure the broadest possible participation of 
Allies concerned in their nuclear sharing arrangements.”398 Throughout the 1960s and 
early 1970s, nearly 40 percent of the U.S. nuclear stockpile in Europe was earmarked for 
wartime use by its allies.399 The United States has had POC agreements with Belgium, 
Canada, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.400 
Many of the weapons systems provided for allied use were those developed for the 
Army.401 
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In 1960, the number of U.S. nuclear weapons in NATO countries reached nearly 
3000; 11 years later, the United States had approximately 7,300 nuclear weapons 
stationed in NATO countries.402 Since that time, the number of U.S. nuclear weapons in 
Europe has steadily declined. Today, published reports state that there are roughly 200 
U.S. tactical nuclear weapons (B61 gravity bombs) based in five NATO European 
countries—Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey.403 Despite the 
relatively low numbers of European-based U.S. nuclear weapons, the United States 
continues to maintain its POC agreements with certain NATO members.404  
Looking back on the history of the Cold War, Major General (Ret.) William F. 
Burns remarked, “NATO’s bet on the utility of tactical nuclear weapons as a deterrent 
apparently paid off.”405 The Army’s European-based nuclear arsenal, however, provided 
a number of benefits beyond simply deterring an attack by Warsaw Pact countries. Paul 
Schulte points out that the tactical nuclear weapons that were deployed to Europe were 
much less expensive than the cost of standing up large conventional NATO forces would 
have been.406 “The long-term effects of lower military expenditure and smaller conscript 
armies helped generate the economic and cultural buoyancy which was such a Western 
competitive advantage in the Cold War,” Schulte says.407 Another benefit of the Army’s 
nuclear weapons is related to the nuclear sharing arrangements established between the 
United States and West Germany, where many of the Army’s nuclear weapons were 
shared with West Germany, including Lance, Nike Hercules, and Pershing missiles; 
155mm and 203mm howitzers; and ADMs.408 According to David Yost, these and other 
arrangements provided strong incentives for West Germany to accede to the Treaty on 
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the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear-weapon state 
(NNWS).409 
The deployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons also helped with assurance and 
alliance cohesion. In 1985, Manfred Wörner, then the West German Defense Minister, 
shared his views about the importance of U.S. nuclear weapons when he acknowledged, 
“We will have to continue to rely on the American nuclear umbrella.”410 The following 
year, former U.S. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger said, “Nuclear weapons 
provide the glue that has held the Western alliance together.”411 Opinion polls of West 
Europeans also reveal that many U.S. allies during the Cold War had more faith in the 
United States to uphold its collective defense obligations than they had in fellow 
European NATO countries.412 Furthermore, in the late 1980s, U.S. defense secretaries 
indicated that the basing of U.S. troops in Europe, a vital component of NATO’s 
deterrent posture, could be contingent on the basing of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons 
there;413 thus, the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons provided deterrence benefits 
beyond the deterrence value of the weapons themselves. Although it is impossible to 
determine the extent to which the Army’s nuclear weapons contributed to the longevity 
and security of NATO, it is fair to say that the Army and its nuclear weapons did play 
important roles in NATO’s security during the Cold War. 
2. South Korea 
On July 27, 1953, the United Nations Command’s Senior Delegate, Lieutenant 
General William Harrison, signed the 1953 Armistice Agreement, ending the Korean 
War.414 South Korean President Syng-man Rhee, concerned that the withdrawal of 
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300,000-plus U.S. troops would leave his country vulnerable to subsequent communist 
aggression, asked the United States to continue to assist in the defense of the Republic of 
Korea (ROK).415 Within a few months, the nations signed the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense 
Treaty, which went into effect in November 1953.416 The treaty stipulated that both 
countries would “develop appropriate means to deter” an attack and “act to meet” an 
attack against either country in the Pacific theater.417 It also authorized the United States 
to “dispose…forces” in South Korea as long as both parties consented.418 For over 60 
years, the United States has upheld its pledge to deter common enemies and to defend 
South Korea. During the immediate post-Armistice period, the United States made its 
promise credible in three important ways: it maintained an initial force large enough to 
assist in the defense of South Korea and the modernization of the ROK military, it 
preserved a long-term military presence based in South Korea to serve as a trip wire in 
the event of an attack, and it eventually deployed tactical nuclear weapons to South 
Korea.419 
The deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons to South Korea began in 1958, after the 
United Nations Command released a statement indicating that the introduction of 
additional weapons into North Korea nullified the 1953 Armistice Agreement, which 
proscribed “the introduction into Korea of reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, 
weapons, and ammunition.”420 There were several further reasons why the United States 
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decided to deploy nuclear weapons to South Korea. The United States wanted to reduce 
its defense spending, improve its combined defenses on the peninsula, and demonstrate 
the credibility of its pledge to defend South Korea against possible future attacks.421  
President Dwight D. Eisenhower authorized the deployment of nuclear weapons 
to South Korea, and, by the end of his administration, the United States had deployed 600 
to the peninsula; the second largest stockpile of U.S. nuclear weapons in Asia (the largest 
one was in Okinawa).422 By 1967, the U.S. deployment of nuclear weapons to the Korean 
Peninsula had reached the highest level in history, that is, 949 weapons.423 According to 
the Nuclear Weapons Databook, the United States also established nuclear sharing 
agreements with South Korea, specifically concerning nuclear-armed Honest John 
rockets, Nike Hercules missiles, 203mm howitzers, and 155mm howitzers.424 In addition 
to these weapons systems, the U.S. Army reportedly secretly deployed Sergeant rockets, 
280mm cannons, and ADMs.425 The basing of these weapons in South Korea was not 
officially made public until 1975.426 Between 1967 and 1977, the United States gradually 
reduced its Pacific land-based nuclear arsenal by over half. By 1977, South Korea was 
the only Asian country to have U.S. nuclear weapons based on its soil, and it remained as 
such until December 1991, when all U.S. nuclear weapons were removed from South 
Korea following a September 1991 decision by President George H.W. Bush.427  
According to Terence Roehrig, “For much of the period of the U.S.-ROK alliance, 
nuclear weapons based in Korea were an important part of the U.S. defense 
                                                 
421 Roehrig, From Deterrence to Engagement, 187. 
422 Norris, Arkin, and Burr, “Where They Were,” 30. 
423 Norris, “United States Nuclear Weapons Deployments Abroad, 1950–1977.” 
424 Cochran, Arkin, and Hoenig, U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities, 94–95. 
425 Roehrig, From Deterrence to Engagement, 188–9. 
426 Ibid., 189. 
427 Norris, Arkin, and Burr, “Where They Were,” 30–31; Norris, “United States Nuclear Weapons 
Deployments,” Pacific Ashore; President George H. W. Bush, “Address to the Nation on Reducing U.S. 
and Soviet Nuclear Weapons, September 27, 1991,” George Bush Presidential Library and Museum, Texas 
A&M University, accessed May 18, 2014, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=3438 
&year=1991&month=9; Wade L. Huntley, “Speed Bump on the Road to Global Zero,” The 
Nonproliferation Review 20, no. 2 (2013): 317–18, doi: 10.1080/10736700.2013.799945.   
 73 
commitment.”428 He points out that these deployments not only contributed to deterrence 
but also helped to prevent South Korea from developing its own nuclear arsenal.429 
According to researcher Peter Hayes, by 1971, President Park Chung-hee had “lost faith 
in the reliability of the U.S. nuclear umbrella and began to develop a home grown bomb, 
even though the United States still had hundreds of nuclear weapons in Korea.”430 After 
Communist forces overran Saigon in 1975, the ROK government signaled that it would 
develop its own nuclear weapons if the United States were to renege on its commitment 
to defend South Korea with nuclear weapons.431 The following year, Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger threatened to dissolve the bilateral alliance and remove U.S. troops and 
nuclear weapons from the peninsula if the ROK government did not abandon its nuclear 
weapons program.432 Kissinger’s threat was sufficient, and the South Korean government 
relinquished its pursuit of a domestic nuclear weapons program.433 This episode in Cold 
War history reveals that South Korea did in fact value its alliance with the United States, 
especially the troops and tactical nuclear weapons that were based on its soil as part of 
the U.S. defense commitment. Army doctrine, training, logistics, and expertise were 
essential to the successful execution of the nuclear mission—to reassure Seoul and deter 
aggression from North Korea. 
3. Japan 
In December 1954, in response to growing tensions between the United States and 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) over the Taiwan straits, President Eisenhower 
authorized the deployment of non-nuclear components of nuclear weapons to U.S. bases 
in Japan and complete nuclear weapons to the island of Okinawa.434 The non-nuclear 
components remained in Japan until June 1965. However, the United States maintained 
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an arsenal of complete nuclear weapons in Okinawa until 1972, when the island was 
formally returned to Japanese control.435 The Okinawa-based weapons consisted of a 
variety of Army, Navy, and Air Force nuclear weapons.436 Between 1954 and 1972, as 
many as 19 different types of U.S. nuclear weapons were based in Okinawa.437 
According to Robert Norris, there were more U.S. nuclear weapons stationed on Okinawa 
between 1961 and 1971 than at any other location in the Pacific theater, and at the peak 
of nuclear deployments to Okinawa, in 1967, there were 1,287 nuclear weapons stationed 
there.438 
On January 19, 1960, the United States and Japan signed the Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America.439 According 
to Wade Huntley, since that time, “the U.S. threat to respond with nuclear weapons to 
any attack on Japan has been the implicit backbone of the U.S. security commitment to 
Japan.”440 Similar to the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty, the Japan-U.S. Security 
Treaty states that “an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the 
administration of Japan” would constitute a threat to the other and stipulates that each 
would “act to meet the common danger.”441 Despite the removal of non-nuclear 
components from Japan in 1965, the United States continued to use bases and ports in 
Japan to transport nuclear weapons in the Pacific region, a practice authorized in a secret 
appendix to the 1960 Security Treaty, according to Robert Norris, William Arkin, and 
William Burr.442 Although Japan has been under the protection of the U.S. nuclear 
umbrella since the end of World War II, the practice of basing U.S. nuclear weapons in 
Okinawa has long since been abandoned. According to Peter Hayes, U.S. strategists 
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eventually came to realize that the nuclear weapons stationed in South Korea and aboard 
naval vessels could serve to reassure Japanese leaders that the United States had adequate 
nuclear forces in the Pacific region, thus eliminating the need to station nuclear weapons 
on Japanese soil.443 Nevertheless, U.S. Army stewardship of nuclear weapons formed a 
vital link in the alliance to defend Japan—and helped to ensure that Japan would have no 
incentive to develop its own nuclear arsenal. 
H. NUCLEAR POWER 
In a chronology of important events, Alice Buck mentions in her history of the 
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) the Shippingport Atomic Power Station, “the world’s 
first full-scale nuclear power plant,” which became fully operational on December 23, 
1957; however, her historical account of the AEC does not include any references to the 
first nuclear power plant to provide electricity to a commercial power grid.444 That feat 
was achieved in an interagency effort by the AEC and the U.S. Army as part of an 
enterprise called the Army Nuclear Power Program (ANPP).445 This nuclear milestone 
was reached at Ft. Belvoir, Virginia, using the Stationary Medium Power Plant Number 1 
(SM-1), the U.S. Army’s first nuclear reactor, which went critical eight months before the 
Shippingport Atomic Power Station achieved full power.446 Three years after the SM-1 
went online, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers assumed complete responsibility for the 
reactor, which was used to produce electricity, conduct research, and train military 
personnel from each of the four armed services.447 During the first year that the Army 
was responsible for the SM-1, the ANPP trained 92 military nuclear reactor operators at 
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Fort Belvoir.448 Emery Chase, a graduate of the Army’s reactor training program and 
former executive officer of the Mobile High Power Plant Number 1A (MH-1A), 
remembered, “We produced a cadre of operators and engineers that safely operated 
[nuclear power] plants for decades.”449 From its inception until the SM-1 was 
deactivated, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers successfully supervised operations at the 
facility for over sixteen years.450 
In 2006, the Department of Energy released a draft version of a historical report 
entitled “Highly Enriched Uranium: Striking a Balance,” which contains information 
about the ANPP and its accomplishments.451 The report states that the ANPP “pioneered 
many technical innovations” and was exclusively responsible for developing nuclear 
power systems for all four military services.452 The accomplishments of the ANPP are 
quite remarkable considering that, during the early years of the AEC, the Commission’s 
General Advisory Committee was unsure how much time or money would be required to 
develop the technology to provide “useful power from nuclear energy.”453 In 1952, the 
Army began a study exploring the military applications of nuclear reactors and provided 
the study’s results to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the following year.454 The Joint Chiefs and 
the Secretary of Defense, Charles Wilson, decided to make the Army responsible for the 
development of the military’s nuclear power plants.455 By 1954, the AEC and the U.S. 
Army had established the ANPP in order to lead the military’s nuclear power efforts and 
to explore ways of using atomic energy to provide heat and electricity to remote military 
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installations.456 Soon thereafter, the ANPP began producing and operating functional 
nuclear power reactors.  
The ANPP lasted for two and a half decades, from 1954 to 1979; during the 
ANPP’s existence, the Army Corps of Engineers built, operated, and eventually 
deactivated nine nuclear power plants.457 In addition to the success of the SM-1 reactor, 
the ANPP was also responsible for a number of other nuclear accomplishments. The 
Portable Medium Power Plant Number 2A (PM-2A) was the first reactor ever to be 
deployed, operated, and later redeployed; the PM-3 was the first to desalinate sea water; 
and the Mobile Low Power Plant Number 1 (ML-1) was the first land mobile nuclear 
power plant.458  
The ANPP designed and produced a number of different types of reactors, 
including pressurized water reactors, boiling water reactors, and gas cooled reactors. 
Some were classified as mobile—others were either portable or stationary. Many of the 
reactors used highly enriched uranium (HEU), but the MH-1A was fueled with low 
enriched uranium (LEU).459  
The ANPP established nuclear power plants at locations across the world. 
Although some of the reactors were located in the continental United States, in states, 
such as Idaho, Virginia, and Wyoming, the PM-2A was set up in Greenland; the SM-1A 
was constructed at Fort Greely, Alaska; and the PM-3A was established at the Naval Air 
Facility in McMurdo, Antarctica.460 Perhaps the ANPP’s most remarkable nuclear power 
plant, however, was the MH-1A, which was placed aboard a renovated World War II 
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liberty ship named the Sturgis and sent to provide electrical power in the Panama Canal 
in 1968.461 
Despite the ANPP’s numerous successes, it was terminated in 1979.462 Although 
the Army still maintains a reactor program to this day, William A. Macon, a former 
program manager, wrote in 2010, “the Army has not been involved with any new reactor 
projects for over 40 years.”463 “Given the Army’s reliance on energy, disruption of 
critical power and fuel supplies would harm the Army’s ability to accomplish its 
missions,” warned Macon, an advocate of reviving the Army’s nuclear power program. 
Macon pointed out that “where the Army successfully used land-based nuclear power 
once before, the Army could help make it happen again.”464 In 2001, Macon coauthored 
an article with Robert A. Pfeffer entitled “Nuclear Power: An Option for the Army’s 
Future.” They argued that the growing scarcity of fuel and potable water coupled with the 
Army’s increasing dependence on technology and logistical support underscores the need 
to develop portable nuclear reactors to support the nation’s deployed military forces.465 
I. VIEWS OF U.S. ARMY OFFICERS 
Throughout my service as Chief of Staff three great tasks confronted me: 
First, to preserve the spirit and pride of an Army which top-level efforts 
steadily sought to reduce to a subordinate place among the three great 
services that make up our country’s shield; second, to deploy this waning 
strength in such a way that ground combat units would be as effective as 
possible in the event of war; and third, to lay the foundations for a totally 
different Army than any we have known to date—an Army trained, 
equipped, and organized to fight and win in an atomic war. 
—General Matthew B. Ridgway, Former Army Chief of Staff466 
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The views of Army officers regarding nuclear weapons during the Cold War were 
as divergent as their opinions concerning the use of nuclear weapons against Japan. Army 
officers did not see eye to eye on the potential use of nuclear weapons against enemy 
targets during the Korean War, nor did they all agree on how the Army should organize 
itself to fight in possible nuclear wars of the future. It should be noted once again that it is 
impossible to assemble from the opinions of officers a general Army viewpoint; 
nevertheless, certain trends regarding the Army’s body of thought can, to some extent, be 
gleaned from the evidence found in memoirs, professional journals, and works of military 
history. 
U.S. leaders, both civilian and military, were forced to confront in Asia, for the 
first time during the Cold War, an important strategic question: Should the United States 
use nuclear weapons to put an end to the limited conflict on the Korean Peninsula? 
Although both General Douglas MacArthur and General Matthew Ridgway, MacArthur’s 
replacement, had requested permission to use nuclear weapons during the conflict,467 not 
all military officers believed that such measures were necessary.468 Some even thought 
that doing so would put the U.N. troops in greater jeopardy and destroy the legitimacy of 
the American war effort. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Omar N. 
Bradley, believed as late as February 1953 that the situation was not yet dire enough to 
warrant the use of nuclear weapons.469 Ridgway’s successor, General James A. Van 
Fleet, told the Senate Appropriations Committee in March 1953 that he did not think that 
nuclear weapons should be used in Korea.470 General J. Lawton Collins, the Army Chief 
of Staff, was also opposed to using nuclear weapons against targets in China, even if 
doing so would have assisted U.N. troops in Korea.471 He believed that nuclear weapons 
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would not have been effective against the well-entrenched communist forces. “Before we 
use them,” he warned, “we had better look to our air defense. Right now we present ideal 
targets for atomic weapons in Pusan and Inchon.”472  
Although the Army’s top leaders were not all able to agree on nuclear weapons 
use during the Korean War, the Asian conflict may have contributed to a consensus 
among Army officers regarding the future of warfare. Not only did the Korean War prove 
that limited wars could still be fought in the nuclear weapons age, but it also revealed 
that, while possession of nuclear weapons might help to deter certain forms of 
aggression, it would not enable the United States to compel its adversaries to meet its 
demands on every occasion. In certain situations, U.S. involvement in nonnuclear 
conflicts would continue to be necessary. While each of the military services continued to 
prepare for nuclear war, the Army did so with the belief that it would most likely 
continue to fight in nonnuclear conflicts similar to the one in Korea. As David Yost 
points out, “Army leaders considered nuclear war a remote possibility in comparison to 
conventional combat.”473 This belief was already widely held by most Army officers as 
early as the mid-1950s,474 and it was maintained throughout the Cold War. In his 1956 
memoir, General Ridgway told of warning Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson that the 
global communist front’s greatest strength “lay in the overwhelming power of its huge 
land forces, and for this reason it might well refrain from initiating the use of the nuclear 
weapon.”475 This same concern was still evident years later as General Bernard W. 
Rogers, who served as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) from 1979 to 
1987, thought that NATO should be prepared to defeat the Soviet Union and its allies in a 
conventional conflict.476 
Another topic of debate among Army officers dealt with the size of the forces 
necessary to fight and win in a nuclear war. Eisenhower’s New Look was designed to 
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reduce the size of conventional forces by replacing manpower with firepower. “The 
threat of the atomic bomb may well reduce the size of units in combat,” said General 
Groves, whose prediction complemented Eisenhower’s defense policies.477 “I do not see 
how large armies can be supported in combat,” Groves said.478 General Omar Bradley, 
however, rejected this assumption. “It would be premature for any planners to attempt to 
substitute atomic weapons for sound balanced forces,” argued Bradley in 1952.479 
“Actually, no matter how many atomic weapons or bombs the collective NATO defense 
may eventually have on hand, there will always be a need for sufficient ground strength 
to force the enemy to concentrate the attack.”480 Many Army leaders reckoned that more 
soldiers would be required to field an army configured for the nuclear battlefield rather 
than a traditional army designed for conventional warfare alone, a notion that ran counter 
to the rationale of the New Look.481 In the early 1950s, General James Gavin considered 
the logistical difficulties that combat units would face on a nuclear battlefield.482 In his 
memoirs, he recalled, “One over-all conclusion stood out clearly, although for several 
years it was the basis of considerable argument: more rather than less manpower would 
be required to fight a nuclear war successfully.”483 General Ridgway also thought that 
more soldiers would be needed for a nuclear war and provided a number of reasons for 
this belief: 
The complex new weapons themselves—the atomic cannon, rockets, and 
guided missiles—require far more men to serve and maintain than did the 
simpler field pieces of World War II and Korea. The prospect of sudden 
and enormous casualties, inflicted by the enemy with his own new 
weapons, makes necessary the training of replacements in great numbers 
for the dead, and a medical establishment larger than ever to care for the 
sick and wounded. In the main, though, the changing shape of the 
battlefield itself sets the requirements for more men….Penetrations of 
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armored and airborne forces in the battle areas of the future may well 
extend two hundred miles or even more in depth, and only by great 
dispersion, in the wars of the future, will ground elements be able to 
survive.484 
Perhaps the most contentious issues affecting the Army’s officer corps—as well 
as the source of the most salient disagreements between the U.S. Army and its civilian 
leaders—during the Eisenhower administration were the President’s New Look policies 
and his strategy of massive retaliation. Russell Weigley notes that Army leaders were 
among those most opposed to Eisenhower’s strategy, and that General Ridgway was the 
first prominent military officer to speak out against massive retaliation.485 In his 
memoirs, Ridgway described a discussion he had with Secretary Wilson, during which he 
explained his views about the strategy: 
My belief was simply this—that we must possess the power of swift and 
devastating retaliation. At the same time we must possess the capability 
for selective retaliation, the capacity to use one arm, or two, or all three—
land, sea, and air combined—to apply whatever degree of force a 
particular situation demanded. The belief seemed to prevail that it was 
enough to hold the threat of the A and H bomb over the head of a 
trembling world. No thinking soldier can accept this view. No honest 
student of military history could believe that the nuclear bomb alone was 
that key to quick and easy victory which mankind has sought since wars 
began.486 
If Ridgway was the first prominent military officer to voice his concerns about 
President Eisenhower’s policies, General Taylor, Ridgway’s successor, was perhaps the 
most vocal. Like Ridgway, he held that the U.S. military needed a more balanced force 
posture.487 During a Senate subcommittee hearing in 1958, General Taylor testified that 
the Army was not sufficiently prepared to meet communist aggression.488 He later wrote, 
“It is my belief that Massive Retaliation as a guiding strategic concept has reached a dead 
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end and that there is an urgent need for a reappraisal of our strategic needs.” Taylor 
pointed to limited wars in China, Greece, Hungary, Korea, Malaya, the Middle East, 
Taiwan, and Vietnam as proof that the threat of massive retaliation alone could not 
prevent conflicts from arising.489  
General Taylor proposed a new strategy, which he called Flexible Response, 
designed to provide the Commander in Chief with more options than the two that had 
been available under the strategy of Massive Retaliation, either nuclear war or retreat.490 
“The new strategy would recognize that it is just as necessary to deter or win quickly a 
limited war as to deter general war,” he explained.491 “Otherwise, the limited war which 
we cannot win quickly may result in our piecemeal attrition or involvement in an 
expanding conflict which may grow into the general war we all want to avoid.”492 It 
should be noted that he wrote these words five years before Congress passed the Gulf of 
Tonkin Resolution and propelled the United States even further into a prolonged, 
expanding conflict that claimed the lives of over 58,000 U.S. service members. It also 
deserves to be mentioned that Flexible Response was adopted by NATO as the 
organization’s strategy in December 1967493 and that it remained NATO’s strategy 
throughout the Cold War.494 
The disagreements arising over President Eisenhower’s defense policies led to 
profound changes in the Army’s leadership. After voicing their concerns, both Ridgway 
and Taylor retired from the Army, although Taylor eventually returned to active military 
service under the Kennedy administration.495 General James Gavin, the Army’s Director 
of Research and Development, also retired after becoming frustrated with what he 
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perceived as a general decline in the Army under the Eisenhower administration.496 It 
should be noted, however, that despite their concerns over President Eisenhower’s 
policies, senior Army leaders did not attempt to undermine presidential authority or 
challenge the primacy of civilian leadership.497 
J. CONCLUSION 
During the early years of the Cold War, the U.S. Army fought to keep from being 
excluded from the nuclear arsenal that it had helped to create during World War II. After 
Eisenhower left the Army for the Oval Office, the U.S. Army competed with its fellow 
military services for resources and relevance. Despite the drastic changes experienced by 
the Cold War Army regarding its nuclear responsibilities, it continued to participate in the 
nation’s nuclear endeavors, exploring new ways to advance the nation’s interests and to 
provide security to the United States and its allies. By acquiring tactical nuclear weapons, 
the Army regained a role in the delivery of nuclear weapons in 1952. While some of the 
Army’s earliest nuclear weapons were too unwieldy to be of much use on the battlefield 
and others were simply impractical, a few of the Army’s weapons systems represented 
cutting edge technology at the time of their development. The Corporal Missile was 
America’s first operational guided missile, and the Army used modified Jupiter-C 
missiles to launch the nation’s first satellites into orbit.  
The Army played a leading role in the development of the Armed Forces Special 
Weapons Project and the Nuclear Weapons Technical Training Group, forerunners of 
today’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency and Defense Nuclear Weapons School. It also 
played an important role in the nation’s first nuclear weapons tests, from which the 
United States gathered important data concerning nuclear weapons and their effects, thus 
enabling America to develop smaller, more efficient, and more powerful nuclear weapons 
(as well as less powerful tactical nuclear weapons). The Army also studied how nuclear 
weapons would affect troops operating on a nuclear battlefield. 
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To better prepare U.S. soldiers to fight the wars of the future, Army officers 
engaged in an extensive theoretical debate about how nuclear weapons would alter 
warfare as well as how the Army should organize itself and conduct operations during a 
nuclear war. The Army created nuclear doctrine, which it incorporated into its military 
education system. It also completely reorganized the composition of its divisions on two 
separate occasions in response to changing national strategies. 
The Army partnered with the AEC to build and operate nuclear power reactors as 
part of the Army Nuclear Power Program (ANPP). Within the ANPP, the Army 
pioneered a number of technological innovations and became the first organization to 
supply electricity to a commercial power grid using a nuclear power reactor. The Army 
operated a total of nine nuclear reactors during the Cold War and provided power reactors 
and training to the other military services. 
In addition to these nuclear efforts, the Army also helped to change national 
strategy. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Army played an important role in the 
development of nuclear weapons. These weapons then became the centerpiece of 
President Eisenhower’s strategy of Massive Retaliation as well as NATO’s strategy. 
General Ridgway and General Taylor, who both thought that Eisenhower’s strategy relied 
too heavily on nuclear weapons, each spoke out against it in an effort to have it replaced 
with a more balanced national security strategy. According to historian Ingo 
Trauschweizer, “Taylor initiated a debate on limited war and helped shift the emphasis of 
national strategy from reliance on nuclear deterrence to flexible response.”498 Even 
General Taylor believed that his efforts to change national strategy were influential. In 
his Swords and Ploughshares, he recalled drafting a policy paper entitled “A National 
Military Program.”499 “I believe that it [the paper] had some influence in bringing the 
Eisenhower Administration in its late years to introduce some flexibility into the national 
strategy,” wrote Taylor.500 Although Army leaders were unable to achieve the changes 
they had hoped for during Eisenhower’s presidency, Taylor’s strategy of Flexible 
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Response was eventually adopted by the Kennedy administration. Furthermore, in 1967, 
Flexible Response became NATO’s official strategy,501 and it remained as such for the 
remainder of the Cold War.502 
In addition to enhancing deterrence and helping to reassure U.S. allies, the Army 
also played an important role in nuclear nonproliferation. Aside from deterring nuclear 
war, the prevention of further nuclear proliferation by U.S. allies was perhaps one of the 
most important accomplishments of the Cold War. U.S. security guarantees and the 
deployment of the Army’s soldiers and tactical nuclear weapons certainly played a 
significant role in stemming the proliferation of nuclear weapons among America’s allies. 
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IV. THE U.S. ARMY’S CONTEMPORARY NUCLEAR ROLES 
“We can now take steps in response to these dramatic developments,” proclaimed 
President George H. W. Bush in 1991, referring to the changes taking place in Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, “steps that can help the Soviet peoples in 
their quest for peace and prosperity. More importantly, we can now take steps to make 
the world a less dangerous place than ever before in the nuclear age.”503 
When the President made these comments, he was announcing drastic unilateral 
changes in the nation’s nuclear posture, and the elimination of the U.S. Army’s nuclear 
weapons was among those changes. While the Army no longer has organic nuclear 
weapons, the service still contributes significantly to America’s nuclear endeavors. This 
chapter examines the missions and capabilities of the personnel and organizations within 
the Army that provide those contributions, thus illuminating the Army’s contemporary 
nuclear roles. The chapter begins with a brief discussion of the redeployment since the 
late 1960s of many of the nation’s nuclear weapons and the impact of the nuclear 
initiatives of 1991. It then considers the opinions of several officers regarding the Army’s 
nuclear capabilities and provides a description of the Army personnel and organizations 
that play a part in the nation’s nuclear endeavors today.  
A. REDEPLOYMENT AND ELIMINATION 
By the late 1960s, the United States was in the process of reducing the total 
number of its deployed nuclear weapons. In 1967, over 3,200 on-shore weapons in the 
Pacific theater were spread across five locations, but after 1967, these numbers steadily 
declined.504 During the next 10 years, the United States reduced its Pacific land-based 
nuclear arsenal by over half. By the end of the 1970s, South Korea was the only Asian 
country to have U.S. nuclear weapons based on its soil, and it remained as such until 
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1991.505 U.S. nuclear weapons deployments to NATO European countries reached an all-
time high of over 7,300 weapons in 1971 before the United States similarly began to 
reduce its stockpiles in Europe.506 In a parallel development, while the United States was 
reducing its nuclear weapons stockpiles abroad, the Canadian government also disbanded 
and withdrew the one Surface-to-Surface Missile Battery, the Canadian Army’s only 
nuclear unit, which had been armed with U.S.-made Honest John rockets and U.S.-owned 
nuclear warheads and had served near Hemer, Germany, until July 1970.507  
Although the United States had already begun to reduce the size of its nuclear 
arsenals abroad during the last two decades of the Cold War, President George H.W. 
Bush made a decision prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union that would result in even 
greater reductions in U.S. overseas nuclear deployments and drastically alter the U.S. 
Army’s nuclear role in the nation’s defense establishment. On September 27, 1991, 
President Bush announced his plan: “I am therefore directing that the United States 
eliminate its entire worldwide inventory of ground-launched short-range, that is, theater 
nuclear weapons. We will bring home and destroy all of our nuclear artillery shells and 
short-range ballistic missile warheads.”508 The President’s decision ultimately meant that 
the Army would no longer have organic nuclear warfighting capabilities. Over the course 
of the next several years, the U.S. Army redeployed its nuclear weapons and transferred 
them to the U.S. Department of Energy for elimination.509 By the mid-1990s, the first 
U.S. military service ever to acquire nuclear weapons had become one of the first two 
services within the U.S. Department of Defense without an atomic arsenal.510  
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B. THE VIEWS OF ARMY OFFICERS 
Although the U.S. Army is a hierarchical organization that acts with unity of 
effort, the opinions of those who serve within the Army can vary greatly from one person 
to the next. Since there have been no rigorous studies conducted to determine Army 
officers’ views on nuclear weapons issues, it is impossible to offer any systematic or 
conclusive judgments regarding their views about nuclear weapons. Any attempt to 
determine the opinions of the Army’s officers concerning nuclear weapons matters must 
be based on fragmentary evidence provided by the few Army officers who have 
published their views; nevertheless, it is worthwhile to take note of some of the available 
publications. 
Within the ranks of Army officers, there were supporters as well as critics of 
President Bush’s nuclear initiatives in 1991. For some, the decision to eliminate ground-
launched non-strategic nuclear weapons probably came as no surprise. In February 1991, 
seven months before the President’s announcement, Lieutenant Colonel John D. Skelton 
wrote that the Army no longer needed to retain its nuclear weapons.511 Skelton argued 
that the threat of nuclear war had been greatly reduced, that the Army’s nuclear arsenal 
was extremely costly in terms of both money and manpower, and that the Army should 
eliminate its weapons and rely upon the Navy and the Air Force to deliver nuclear 
weapons in support of ground forces in the event of a nuclear war.512 In contrast, Captain 
Daniel S. Roper, writing in 1993, said that the President’s decision had “resulted in a less 
flexible U.S. nuclear posture and…potentially weakened the future deterrent capability of 
U.S. forces at a time when it is most needed.”513 He maintained that the removal of its 
organic nuclear weapons left the Army vulnerable to attacks by adversaries armed with 
nuclear weapons, and he questioned the effectiveness of nuclear fire support from naval 
and air forces.514  
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General Colin Powell believed that the Army’s nuclear arsenal was no longer 
necessary. In early September 1991, acting upon the orders of the President while serving 
as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Powell, along with the Secretary of 
Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, worked out the measures that would make up 
Bush’s Presidential Nuclear Initiatives.515 “Within days, we had developed a proposal 
that far exceeded the elimination I had urged of artillery-launched nukes,” recalled 
Powell in his 1995 autobiography. “The scope was sweeping. Get rid of short-range 
nuclear weapons, like the Army’s Lance missiles.”516 Less than a year and a half after 
Bush’s announcement, Powell reported that the elimination of the Army’s nuclear 
weapons had resulted in “significant” savings.517 Throughout his career, Powell had been 
exposed to nuclear weapons, taught how to use them, and faced with the prospects of 
their use.518 In fact, one of his first missions upon entering the Army had been to guard 
an atomic cannon in Germany.519 Reflecting on his career in 2010, Powell remarked, 
“The more I got into nuclear weapons, the more I realized these weapons must never be 
used.”520 
Recently, soldiers within the Army’s nuclear community have written about the 
service’s role in nuclear operations. Chief Warrant Officer 5 (CW5) Stephen A. Gomes 
alluded to the importance of the Army contributions to joint offensive nuclear planning in 
an article for the Combating WMD Journal.521 “Should deterrence fail and the nuclear 
option be invoked,” wrote Gomes, “the ground commander…would still be responsible 
for what happens on the ground and how the use of nuclear weapons may affect the 
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scheme of maneuver.”522 LTC James Demyanovich also recognized the importance of 
joint nuclear management, adding that the Army’s status as a non-nuclear weapons 
service placed it in a position to offer objective recommendations regarding nuclear force 
planning.523 
C. THE ARMY’S CONTEMPORARY NUCLEAR ROLES 
Although the post-Cold War Army has not been equipped with organic nuclear 
delivery systems, this has not stopped the service from participating in the nation’s 
nuclear endeavors. In the years immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
the U.S. Army’s nuclear forces continued to adapt and evolve to satisfy the needs of the 
nation and to prepare for the challenges of the future. During the early 1990s, as the 
Army’s nuclear weapons were being eliminated, Army leaders decided to maintain a 
group of officers proficient in nuclear weapons matters and dedicated specifically to 
nuclear operations.524 These officers came to make up the Army’s Functional Area 52 
(FA-52, Nuclear and Counterproliferation), a functional group that continues its work to 
this day.525  
The remainder of this chapter examines the Army’s contemporary nuclear roles. 
The next section describes FA-52, its purposes, and the various ways in which FA-52 
officers serve their nation. The following two sections discuss the U.S. Army Nuclear and 
Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Agency (USANCA) and the nuclear 
components of the 20th Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives 
Command. Finally, before concluding, this chapter considers the Army organizations 
dedicated to air and missile defense, the 100th
 
Missile Defense Brigade and three Army 
Air and Missile Defense Commands (AAMDCs).  
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1. Functional Area 52 (Nuclear and Counterproliferation) 
Today, the Army’s nuclear officers are organized under the Operations Support 
functional category FA-52, a functional area managed by the Department of the Army’s 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Training.526 The mission of this 
functional area is “to provide technical advice and support in developing national and 
military strategy, plans and policy recommendations to Army, Combatant Command, 
Department of Defense, and Interagency leadership in nuclear related Combating WMD 
mission areas.”527 To accomplish this mission, officers within FA-52 must be proficient 
in five functional competencies, which include “strategy, plans, policy and operations; 
research, development and capabilities; doctrine, education and training; modeling and 
simulation; and combating WMD.”528 This means that FA-52 officers must apply their 
skills and knowledge across a broad range of nuclear issues.  
The Nuclear and Counterproliferation Functional Area takes numerous steps to 
ensure that its officers are prepared to meet the many challenges inherent in such a 
demanding career field. First, the functional area actively seeks officers with academic 
degrees in mathematics, science, and engineering or with experience in fields pertaining 
to combating weapons of mass destruction.529 As part of the selection process, applicants 
are required to possess the aptitude necessary to complete advanced civilian schooling 
since FA-52 provides all of its officers with an opportunity to pursue advanced degrees in 
the fields of science, intelligence, or other disciplines related to weapons of mass 
destruction.530 Furthermore, its officers must complete the Army’s Nuclear and 
Counterproliferation Officer Course in order to become qualified as FA-52 officers.531 
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The FA-52 qualification course is taught by the USANCA at the Defense Threat 
Reduction Agency’s Defense Nuclear Weapons School located at Kirtland Air Force 
Base in Albuquerque, New Mexico.532 During the 176 hours of course training, the 
Army’s nuclear officers receive instruction on subjects, such as the U.S. nuclear weapons 
program and stockpile, nuclear surety, counterproliferation programs, homeland defense, 
and issues pertaining to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons.533 The 
Nuclear and Counterproliferation Functional Area’s accession, training, and education 
process provides the Department of Defense with a valuable cadre of nuclear experts at a 
level unmatched by other services.534 
Although there are several organizations within the Army to which many FA-52 
officers are typically assigned, Nuclear and Counterproliferation officers also serve in 
many joint, combined, and interagency organizations. FA-52 officers are assigned to 
several geographical and functional Combatant Commands (COCOMs), such as Pacific 
Command, European Command, Northern Command, Special Operations Command, and 
Strategic Command. FA-52 officers also serve as advisors in the U.S. Mission to NATO. 
Joint and Interagency assignments include various intelligence organizations as well as 
the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department 
of Energy. Furthermore, within the Department of the Army (DA), Nuclear and 
Counterproliferation officers serve in the DA Headquarters as well as in organizations, 
such as the USANCA and the 20th Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and 
Explosives (CBRNE) Command, both of which are discussed below. 
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2. U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency  
The U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency (USANCA) is a field operating 
agency (FOA) under the management and guidance of the Department of the Army’s 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Training.535 The agency’s mission is to 
provide “nuclear and combating weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) planning and 
execution expertise for the implementation of Army CWMD strategy and policy at the 
Corps level and above in order that the Army meet Joint operational requirements in 
achieving national objectives to combat weapons of mass destruction (WMD).”536 The 
origins of the USANCA date back to the early years of the Cold War. Its earliest 
predecessor, the Office of Special Weapons Development, was established in 1952 and 
was eventually replaced in sequence by the U.S. Army Nuclear Group, the Combat 
Developments Command Nuclear Agency, the U.S. Army Nuclear Agency, the U.S. 
Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency, and finally, in 2008, by the U.S. Army Nuclear and 
Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Agency.537  
Although the agency is comprised of a total of only 34 DA civilians and Army 
officers proficient in CWMD,538 it is responsible for performing 11 key tasks, each one 
with a number of requisite subtasks, and the Department of the Army has authorized the 
USANCA to communicate directly with any U.S. government organization or official 
that it deems necessary in the performance of its duties.539 One of the agency’s most 
important tasks is to enhance the survivability of forces operating in chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) environments.540 To accomplish this task, the 
USANCA provides design criteria for Army equipment, reviews the specifications for 
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new systems, and provides recommendations on systems development and testing to 
ensure that new equipment is capable of operating in CBRN environments.541 The 
agency also coordinates with the Office of the Surgeon General to establish nuclear and 
radiological survivability criteria for soldiers.542  
Another important task that the USANCA is required to perform is to “support the 
Army’s capability to plan for the Joint employment of nuclear weapons as well as 
conventional attacks on nuclear related facilities.”543 In order to carry out this 
responsibility, the agency must be prepared to deploy Nuclear Employment 
Augmentation Teams (NEATs) to provide nuclear planning support to Army Service 
Component Commands (ASCCs) and Joint Force Land Component Commands 
(JFLCCs).544 NEATs are ad hoc teams of two to twelve personnel consisting of Army 
officers and DA civilians from USANCA, who, once deployed, come under the 
operational control (OPCON) of the supported component command.545 The teams serve 
as a source of knowledge regarding nuclear targeting and effects; they are capable of 
supporting training, planning, exercises, and operations; and they can augment supported 
commands for extended durations.546 
3. 20th Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives 
Command 
Headquartered at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland, the 20th Chemical, 
Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives (CBRNE) Command, formerly known 
as the 20th Support Command, is a subordinate command of U.S. Army Forces 
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Command (FORSCOM).547 Its missions include preparing and deploying CBRNE forces, 
exercising command and control during CBRNE operations in support of Joint and Army 
force commanders, supporting homeland defense, and maintaining links with necessary 
federal and state CBRNE assets.548 The command was created in 2004 to enable the 
Army to manage its CBRNE assets more efficiently by placing all of the Army’s CBRNE 
units under one centralized headquarters.549 In 2006, the Department of Defense 
increased the responsibilities of the 20th CBRNE Command. That year’s Quadrennial 
Defense Review (QDR) Report called for the development of capabilities that would 
“enable it to serve as a Joint Task Force capable of rapid deployment to command and 
control WMD elimination and site exploitation missions by 2007.”550 
In addition to its Operational Command Post (OCP), which is capable of 
deploying and serving as the headquarters of the Joint Task Force (JTF) for WMD 
Elimination (WMD-E), the 20th CBRNE also has two other deployable assets that 
provide nuclear expertise to supported commands: CBRNE Coordination Elements 
(CCEs) and Nuclear Disablement Teams (NDTs).551 CCEs consist of chemical, nuclear, 
and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) officers and soldiers, intelligence and 
communications personnel, and, if necessary, health and environmental experts.552 These 
elements are capable of augmenting component command staffs; providing technical 
CBRNE expertise; and reaching back to other U.S. defense, scientific, and technological 
experts for information if necessary.553 
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Nuclear Disablement Teams consist of eleven personnel with various 
occupational specialties; a typical team is made up of six FA-52 officers, one EOD 
officer, one health physics officer, one health physics non-commissioned officer (NCO), 
and two chemical NCOs.554 NDTs have two fundamental missions. As their name 
suggests, the primary mission of the NDTs is to assess the nuclear weapons production 
infrastructure of nuclear proliferators and, if necessary, disable said infrastructure.555 
Their secondary mission is to support the National Technical Nuclear Forensics (NTNF) 
Ground Sampling Mission (GSM) by deploying as a member of an interagency task force 
to an explosion site involving either nuclear or radiological weapons in order to collect 
samples for forensics testing.556  
NDTs are equipped with Smart Threads Integrated Radiation Sensors (STIRS), 
which consist of a variety of detectors that can be mounted on vehicles or aerial platforms 
or, in the case of man-portable variants, carried by soldiers.557 Other equipment includes 
secure communication devices, handheld computers, spectrum analysis equipment, 
cameras, personal protective equipment, vehicles, respiration equipment, and breaching 
tools.558 In regard to their primary mission, NDTs are trained and equipped to conduct 
reconnaissance of a target location, gain entry into nuclear facilities, conduct assessments 
to determine the level of production and sophistication, seize sensitive nuclear materials 
and equipment, and temporarily disable key facilities.559 In situations where disassembly 
of nuclear facilities is deemed necessary, NDTs will be relieved-in-place, most likely by 
a government contractor capable of handling such a large-scale undertaking.560 
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4. Air and Missile Defense 
In addition to the Army’s nuclear roles mentioned above, the Army also provides 
another capability relevant to the nation’s nuclear endeavors—air and missile defense. 
Although there are no FA-52 officers serving in either the 100th Missile Defense Brigade 
or the AAMDCs, these organizations serve to protect the nation and its allies from attacks 
with nuclear-armed ballistic and cruise missiles. While the former is a national missile 
defense organization, the latter are theater-oriented organizations.561 
The 100th Missile Defense Brigade is headquartered in Colorado Springs, 
Colorado, but the organization’s ground-based mid-course defense (GMD) interceptor 
units are located at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base (AFB), 
California.562 The 100th Brigade is a subordinate unit of the U.S. Army Space and 
Missile Defense Command/Army Forces Strategic Command (SMDC/ARSTRAT), 
headquartered at the Redstone Arsenal in Alabama.563 SMDC/ARSTRAT serves as the 
Army Service Component Command (ASCC) to U.S. Strategic Command.564 The 
brigade primarily consists of air defense National Guard soldiers serving on full-time 
status and military police, who guard the installation in Alaska.565 Although the mission 
of the 100th Missile Defense Brigade is a difficult one, its mission statement is quite 
simple: defend the United States against ballistic missiles.566 This mission is similar to 
one given to the Army in 1969, when Congress approved the short-lived Safeguard 
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Program, in which the U.S. Army deployed Spartan and Sprint missiles in 1975 to North 
Dakota, at America’s first ABM site.567 
The 100th Missile Defense Brigade’s approximately 30 to 40 GMD interceptors, 
developed by Boeing et al. beginning in 1998, rely on solid fuel, three-stage rocket 
engines to launch kinetic kill vehicles into space, where, if successful, they collide with 
and destroy inbound ballistic missiles during the mid-course phase of the missile’s 
flight.568 The system acquires targets using flight data obtained from U.S. systems on 
land, at sea, and in space.569 As of 2014, there have been eight successful test 
interceptions using the GMD system.570 One such test occurred on December 10, 2008, 
when soldiers of the 49th Missile Defense Battalion, 100th Brigade, launched an 
interceptor based at Vandenberg AFB from their Fire Direction Center in Alaska.571 This 
test provided valuable data useful to enhance America’s missile defense network.572 
The Army also has three AAMDCs dedicated to supporting combatant commands 
overseas: the 32nd AAMDC, the 94th AAMDC, and the 10th AAMDC. The 32nd 
AAMDC, headquartered at Fort Bliss, Texas, is a subordinate command of U.S. Army 
Forces Command (FORSCOM) and consists of four Air Defense Artillery (ADA) 
brigades: the 11th ADA, the 31st ADA, the 69th ADA, and the 108th ADA.573 The 
command’s mission is “to conduct joint and combined air and missile defense operations 
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in support of the war fighting combatant commander.”574 To accomplish this mission, the 
command is prepared to deploy its brigades overseas to support Army and joint 
component commands within 72 hours of notification.575 Both the 94th and the 10th 
AAMDCs are based overseas. The 94th AAMDC is headquartered at Fort Shafter, 
Hawaii, and falls under the command of U.S. Army Pacific;576 the 10th AAMDC, a 
subordinate command of U.S. Army Europe, is located in Kaiserslautern, Germany.577  
Each of the AAMDCs serving under active Army commands is equipped with 
Patriot missiles.578 Developed by Raytheon, Patriots are ground-launched, long-range, 
high-altitude missiles capable of destroying ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and aircraft 
carrying nuclear warheads (or other payloads) and can function either independently or as 
components of a more robust network of missile defense systems.579 The 32nd AAMDC 
also has two batteries in the 11th ADA Brigade equipped with Terminal High Altitude 
Area Defense (THAAD) systems.580 Like the GMD system, the THAAD can use data 
from sea-based Aegis platforms, satellites, and land-based sensors.581 The THAAD can 
also be linked with other missile defense systems, such as Patriot batteries.582 It is 
capable of intercepting ballistic missiles both within and beyond the Earth’s atmosphere, 
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and it has successfully intercepted its targets during each of its eleven tests.583 THAAD 
systems are also deployable. In April 2013, the 4th ADA Regiment became the first 
THAAD battery to deploy overseas, when it was sent to Guam to defend against potential 
missile attacks from North Korea.584 
D. CONCLUSION 
Neither the end of the Cold War nor the 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives 
obviated the need for the Army to continue to be a part of the nation’s nuclear endeavors. 
These events simply altered the Army’s nuclear roles. Although the Army no longer has 
its own organic nuclear weapons, America’s premier land service continues to strive to 
improve a number of aspects of the nation’s nuclear capabilities. The missions and 
capabilities of the organizations described in this chapter highlight the significant 
contributions that the Army continues to make to America’s nuclear endeavors. 
The Army’s FA-52 officers provide U.S. government organizations with an 
unparalleled source of knowledge and expertise regarding Army operations and nuclear 
weapons. USANCA works to support the nation’s CWMD objectives, enhance the 
survivability of U.S. military forces, and augment ASCCs and JFLCCs to assist in the 
development of joint nuclear and conventional operational plans. The 20th CBRNE 
Command is capable of serving as the nation’s JTF for WMD-E, providing CBRNE 
expertise to component commanders, disabling nuclear infrastructure, and participating in 
sampling missions to support nuclear forensics operations in the event of a radiological or 
nuclear attack. Furthermore, despite the controversies surrounding America’s ballistic 
missile defense policies, the Army uses its air and missile defense capabilities to protect 
the United States, its allies, and designated locations and facilities from nuclear-armed 
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ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and aircraft, and the Army has also become involved in 
policy discussions related to ballistic missile defense.585 
Despite the numerous nuclear-related capabilities that the Army currently provides, 
the Army can continue to improve in at least two areas. Within the U.S. military, the 
Army can work to enhance the capabilities of its general purpose forces.586 Combating 
WMD during a major conflict in places, such as Northeast Asia, Southwest Asia, or 
South Asia would require a capacity to conduct prolonged, large-scale CWMD 
operations,, one far exceeding the level currently offered by the Army’s CBRNE forces. 
A second area of improvement concerns the capabilities of U.S. allies and security 
partners. Here too the Army can play an important part in CWMD. By providing U.S. 
allies and partners with special training and equipment, the Army can build greater 
capacity among America’s allies and security partners to prevent and counter the 
proliferation of WMD, mitigate the dangers of CBRNE attacks, and manage the 
consequences of attacks should they occur.587 Just as the Army adapted to meet the 
nation’s defense needs during World War II, the Cold War, and the post-Cold War 
period, the U.S. Army’s nuclear-focused assets now must continually prepare to respond 
to threats as they evolve. 
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V. CONCLUSION: THE ARMY’S NUCLEAR ROLES 
Historical evidence suggests that, since 1942, the U.S. Army has made many 
important contributions to America’s nuclear undertakings, although its nuclear roles 
have evolved over the years. To begin with, the Army played an integral role in the 
development and use of the world’s first nuclear weapons. During World War II, the U.S. 
Army not only administered and funded America’s secret nuclear weapons program, but 
it also allocated vital Army personnel to speed the development process. Writing about 
the Manhattan Project, historian Vincent Jones observed, “During the course of this 
unprecedented undertaking, the Army had a significant role in orchestrating almost every 
aspect of atomic development,—from the design, construction, and operation of large-
scale production plants to strategic planning for the employment of the atomic bomb.”588 
While scientific expertise was a critical component of America’s nuclear weapons 
program, scientific knowhow alone was not sufficient to produce nuclear weapons. 
Uranium enrichment and plutonium production required a level of industrial capacity that 
few nations during World War II (and even during the Cold War) were capable of 
achieving. The U.S. Army exploited America’s industrial and scientific capabilities 
during World War II by assembling and managing a massive workforce for the 
Manhattan Project, overseeing the construction of the infrastructure needed to develop 
nuclear weapons, and putting them both to use to achieve a common goal, the rapid 
development of weapons unmatched in their destructive potential. Without the 
contributions of Army personnel during World War II, it is unlikely that the United States 
would have been able to develop nuclear weapons as efficiently and promptly as it did.  
In addition to playing an important role in the development and use of America’s 
first nuclear weapons, the Army also took on a number of other important nuclear roles. 
Army personnel were responsible for carrying out some of the nation’s first 
counterproliferation operations. Soldiers of the Manhattan Engineer District also 
conducted investigations to measure the physical and health effects of the nuclear 
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weapons used against Japan to end the war. Furthermore, the Army continued to 
supervise America’s peacetime nuclear program for over a year after the war before it 
was finally turned over to the Atomic Energy Commission.  
Although its nuclear responsibilities were significantly altered during the early 
years of the Cold War, the Army continued to participate in America’s nuclear 
endeavors. The Army fielded, deployed, maintained, and trained on the employment of a 
variety of tactical nuclear weapons systems, including nuclear-capable artillery pieces, 
rockets, and missiles. The Army helped to develop the organizations that were 
forerunners of the modern-day Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the Defense 
Nuclear Weapons School. It took part in many of America’s nuclear tests, from which the 
United States gained valuable information that it later used to develop more sophisticated 
nuclear and conventional weapons. The Army also took measures to prepare for a nuclear 
war by developing nuclear doctrine, reorganizing its forces, and taking measures to 
defend the homeland against nuclear attacks. Additionally, the Army managed its own 
nuclear power program, became involved in the development of nuclear strategy, and 
helped to reassure U.S. allies and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
Clearly, the Army took on many different nuclear roles during World War II and 
the Cold War. Perhaps what is most impressive about the Army’s contributions to 
America’s nuclear endeavors during this period is that it was able to take on these nuclear 
responsibilities during a period when the organization was also involved in a number of 
other important conventional engagements. The Army assisted in the development of 
nuclear weapons at a time when it was simultaneously engaged in fighting the largest war 
the world has ever known. It developed missiles and rockets capable of delivering nuclear 
warheads while it was fighting North Korean and Chinese forces on the Korean 
Peninsula. Finally, the Army maintained forward-deployed arsenals of tactical nuclear 
weapons in both Europe and Asia despite its heavy involvement in the Vietnam War. 
Following the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Army’s nuclear roles continued to 
evolve. Today, the Army’s nuclear officers provide the Department of Defense with a 
cadre of soldiers versed in the technical and strategic aspects of nuclear weapons. The 
Army also currently maintains units dedicated to combatting and eliminating WMD; 
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understanding and limiting CBRNE effects; participating in nuclear forensics; conducting 
nuclear counterproliferation missions; developing operational plans involving nuclear 
weapons; and defending against attacks using nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, cruise 
missiles, and aircraft. Although these functions have received relatively little attention 
when compared with the Army’s conventional roles in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other 
volatile countries, the Army’s contemporary nuclear roles are significant, particularly 
given the nuclear threats that have emerged in recent years.589  
A. HOW NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAVE CHANGED THE ARMY 
Although the research conducted for this study focused primarily on determining 
the extent of the Army’s contributions to the nation’s nuclear endeavors, it has also 
revealed the interdependent relationship between the Army and nuclear weapons. While 
the Army has played a significant role in the evolution of U.S. nuclear weapons and 
strategies, the Army’s evolution has also been strongly influenced by nuclear weapons 
and the strategies developed because of their existence. Nuclear weapons first altered the 
course of the Army’s development by removing the need to invade Japan’s main islands 
during World War II, thus shortening the war, eliminating the need for a larger land 
force, and increasing the role of air power in warfare.  
The Eisenhower administration’s nuclear strategy and defense policies resulted in 
four important changes to the Army. First, the Army was drastically reduced in size after 
the Korean War. Without nuclear weapons to deter Soviet aggression in Central Europe, 
it is possible that the United States would have attempted to maintain a much larger land 
force in Europe than it did. Second, the U.S. military services that had traditionally 
served as America’s dominant defense institutions—the Army and the Navy—found 
themselves competing for roles and funding with the U.S. Air Force, which was given a 
more prominent role in the nation’s defense under the Eisenhower administration. The 
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third change to the Army brought about by the advent of nuclear weapons was the 
creation and implementation of the Pentomic concept. Under President Eisenhower, the 
Army received, maintained, and deployed tactical nuclear weapons; it also reorganized its 
forces in order to meet the presumed demands of the nuclear battlefield.  
Finally, disagreements over the roles of land forces and nuclear weapons in 
defense strategy resulted in significant changes to the Army’s leadership. General 
Matthew Ridgway, a highly respected officer with an impressive military resume, retired 
from the Army after serving as the Chief of Staff when he was not reappointed by 
President Eisenhower over a disagreement regarding the Commander-in-Chief’s defense 
strategy.590 General Maxwell Taylor, another respected war veteran, also retired from the 
Army after opposing the strategy of Massive Retaliation as the Army’s Chief of Staff, 
although he later returned to active duty during the Kennedy administration.591 Even 
General James Gavin, the Chief of Army Research and Development, retired from the 
Army because of Eisenhower’s defense policies.592 
Nuclear weapons continued to influence the Army’s evolution even after 
President Eisenhower left office. Under President Kennedy, the Army once again 
implemented sweeping changes to its organization. The Army’s ROAD concept was 
developed in response to directives by President Kennedy, which corresponded to his 
views regarding nuclear weapons and the prospects for non-nuclear war.  
Nuclear weapons also had another important effect on the Army during the 1960s. 
The focus on technology and nuclear weapons during President Eisenhower’s time in 
office coupled with the radical changes to the Army’s organization brought about as a 
result of different defense strategies left the Army somewhat unprepared for the conflict 
in Vietnam. “As the Army became more and more concerned with nuclear warfare in the 
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late 1950s, its interest in counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare waned,” wrote 
Major Robert A. Doughty.593 “By the beginning of the 1960s, the U.S. Army was not 
prepared in doctrine or equipment for conducting counterinsurgency operations.”594 
Historian Ingo Trauschweizer noted, “Following its reforms, the army had become a 
competent deterrent force in Europe, but it was unprepared for combat operations in 
Vietnam.”595  
By helping to create nuclear weapons, the U.S. Army sowed the seeds of its own 
drastic post-war reduction (in terms of both its size and its status). Although the Army 
eventually regained its role as a nuclear-capable force, it suffered through a period of 
radical changes to its organization, and it eventually lost several of its most accomplished 
leaders because of their views regarding the Army’s role in future wars. After being 
subjected to all of these changes, the Army went up against an enemy in Vietnam for 
which it was not prepared, one that could neither be deterred with nuclear weapons nor 
defeated with superior technology. When examining the Army’s past nuclear roles, it 
would be a mistake to study the extent of the Army’s influence on America’s nuclear 
programs without also considering the role that nuclear weapons have played in shaping 
the Army. 
B. FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE 
The United States has maintained a long tradition of severely reducing its post-
bellum military forces. In 1993, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell 
pointed out the pitfalls of continuing this tradition: 
Throughout the Roaring Twenties and the Great Depression that followed, 
maintaining a strong military was never a national priority. And we paid 
for it. We paid when totalitarian governments began their expansionist 
aggression, aggression that might have been deterred by the existence of 
strong U.S. forces. We paid at Pearl Harbor, and at Kasserine Pass in 
North Africa. When World War II ended in victory, we repeated our 
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mistake. Again we failed to keep our forces ready, and we again paid the 
price in Korea, in the awful retreat to the Pusan perimeter.596 
Throughout the Eisenhower administration, the United States relied on its nuclear 
arsenal to deter aggression while drastically reducing its spending on conventional 
defenses. During this period, the U.S. Army was significantly reduced in size, primarily 
because President Eisenhower did not envision the United States becoming involved in 
another large, protracted land war. Nevertheless, U.S. leaders gradually decided in the 
1960s that such a conflict was necessary in Vietnam. Once again, U.S. troops, especially 
ground troops, paid dearly for the nation’s unpreparedness.  
Today, after over a decade of conflict in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines, and 
elsewhere, the U.S. Army is once again being reduced. In February 2014, Defense 
Secretary Chuck Hagel announced plans to cut defense spending, reduce the size of the 
U.S. Army to pre-World War II levels, and retire the U.S. fleet of A-10 aircraft.597 The 
reason why the Department of Defense is pursuing such reductions is spelled out clearly 
in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR): “Our forces will no longer be sized to 
conduct large-scale prolonged stability operations.”598 While reducing the size of the 
ground forces, the Department of Defense plans to “protect key capability areas,” 
specifically cyber; missile defense; nuclear deterrence; space; air; sea; precision strike; 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR); and counter terror and special 
operations.599 By not including land as one of its key capability areas, the Department of 
Defense appears to be taking a page from President Eisenhower’s book of strategy. While 
the QDR specifies that the size of the ground forces will be reduced, it also states that the 
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equipment of the Air Force and the Navy will be modernized, and it specifically refers to 
the purchase of Joint Strike Fighters, aircraft that have dubious potential for providing 
ground forces with effective Close Air Support (CAS). While it is clearly the preference 
of current U.S. leaders to rely on strike technology to fight the nation’s future wars, it 
should be noted that superior technology would not always ensure military victory. 
Following the Korean War, General Taylor drafted a letter to General Ridgway, in which 
he discussed the limitations of employing sophisticated military equipment during that 
conflict: 
An outstanding impression from the operations in Korea has been the 
ineffectiveness or inapplicability of many of our modern weapons to the 
requirement of the Korean type of limited war. I refer particularly to the 
weapons of the Air Force, the Navy and the Armor, to which certain other 
Army weapons and equipment may be added. The enemy, terrain, and 
weather combined to nullify in a large measure much of the costly 
equipment assembled during and after World War II in preparation for a 
possible World War III….To these restrictions we added the subjective 
factor of our own reluctance to use atomic and other special weapons in 
which we have been investing a large part of the military budget. The 
absence of an opponent prevented the useful employment of much of our 
air and naval strength. Except for the MIG’s in the northwest corner of the 
peninsula, there was no airborne enemy to combat. Similarly, at sea the 
mightiest war ships of the world were obliged to occupy themselves with 
shelling relatively unimportant targets ashore, or with maintaining a 
blockade against negligible enemy naval forces.600 
In 1989, Carl Builder predicted that the next major war would probably “not be a 
naval or air war” but that it might “stress the Army capabilities to the point that its 
preparations and competency are once again brought into question.”601 He anticipated 
that such wars of the future might be “characterized by the services as ‘third world’ or 
‘low intensity’ conflicts…but that [they] could, nevertheless, leave the Army gasping and 
sweating just to keep from falling on its face.”602 In describing one of his predicted future 
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wars, Builder provided an accurate depiction of both Operation Enduring Freedom-
Afghanistan (OEF-A) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).  
Just because current U.S. leaders do not anticipate the United States participating 
in another large-scale prolonged stability operation does not necessarily mean that the 
United States will always be able to avoid becoming involved in such an operation. Past 
U.S. leaders have made reductions to the military based on similar assumptions. The 
conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan should serve as reminders that even 
though the United States military possesses overwhelming technological advantages over 
its adversaries, these cannot guarantee that the United States will be able to deter or 
compel its adversaries on every occasion. 
Another feature of the 2014 QDR that is particularly salient is its focus on nuclear 
deterrence, which seemingly conflicts with the administration’s stated goal of “reducing 
the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy.”603 Deemphasizing 
nuclear weapons, which the United States and its NATO Allies have sought to do over 
the years, will require greater attention to conventional forces. Given the current fiscal 
constraints on defense spending, U.S. leaders will need to make difficult decisions 
regarding the composition of America’s conventional military forces. Before any 
decisions are made, those leaders should carefully consider the lessons of the past. War is 
sometimes unavoidable, and, when it occurs, it often requires the United States to deploy 
land forces. While technology can provide the U.S. military with remarkable advantages 
over its adversaries, it may not always guarantee U.S. military victory. Furthermore, as 
more advanced military systems are introduced onto the battlefield over time, the United 
States will need to maintain an army of soldiers trained to perform in increasingly 
challenging environments. Gone are the days when citizens could take up muskets in 
defense of their country. Now, the United States must maintain a land force that is trained 
rigorously and kept proficient in the full range of battlefield contingencies, including 
those involving nuclear weapons. Drastic post-conflict reductions and pre-conflict 
expansions prevent the Army from maintaining such a state of readiness. While many 
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people prefer to downplay the role of nuclear weapons in future conflict, some countries 
appear to be moving in the opposite direction, increasing the likelihood that U.S. armed 
forces will be required to respond to nuclear threats. It is time for the United States to 
reevaluate its tradition of post-conflict downsizing of the military. It is expensive to 
maintain a large, capable ground force; nevertheless, that is the price that the leader of the 
free world must pay in order to “remain the greatest force for freedom and security that 
the world has ever known.”604 
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